On the Interplay between Extortion and Punishment. An Agent Based Model of "Camorra"
Journal title SOCIOLOGIA E RICERCA SOCIALE
Author/s Barbara Sonzogni, Federico Cecconi, Rosaria Conte
Publishing Year 2013 Issue 2012/99 Language English
Pages 13 P. 65-77 File size 709 KB
DOI 10.3280/SR2012-099004
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This paper presents an Agent-Based Model aimed to reproduce the demographics, economic and employment variables of a Southern Italian region (Campania) where one specific variant of Extortion Racketeering Systems (Erss), camorra, is highly active and prosperous. Preliminary results of a set of simulations show the effects of varying levels of extortion and punishment on the rates of inactivity, employment, etc. of a population of agents endowed with social learning mechanisms
Barbara Sonzogni, Federico Cecconi, Rosaria Conte, On the Interplay between Extortion and Punishment. An Agent Based Model of "Camorra" in "SOCIOLOGIA E RICERCA SOCIALE " 99/2012, pp 65-77, DOI: 10.3280/SR2012-099004