Representations and scientific realism
Journal title EPISTEMOLOGIA
Author/s Evandro Agazzi
Publishing Year 2012 Issue 2012/1 Language English
Pages 17 P. 13-29 File size 231 KB
DOI 10.3280/EPIS2012-001002
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When it is spoken of scientific representations it is often understood that science can offer "only" representations but does not enable us to know reality. This tenet is the inheritance of a gratuitous and inconsistent presupposition that affected modern philosophy during almost two centuries, according to which we know our representations and not things, and we have to find warranties in order to believe that such representations correspond to reality (epistemological dualism). The present paper analyzes this presupposition, shows its inconsistency and, through a discourse regarding the relations between thought and ontology, between sense and reference of the intellectual constructions, between abstract encoding of properties and concrete exemplification of the same by means of operational criteria of reference, justifies the cognitive purport of scientific representations, including the mathematical representations of physical phenomena.
Keywords: Realism, epistemological dualism, encoding, exemplifying, operationality, sense and reference.
Evandro Agazzi, Representations and scientific realism in "EPISTEMOLOGIA" 1/2012, pp 13-29, DOI: 10.3280/EPIS2012-001002