The models most used by scholars and which find the widest echo in the manuals and in managerial formation utility model, game theory share an analytical rational paradigm that not only leaves little space for the bargainers’ freedom, but also neglects their cognitive dimension. In the studies where this does not occur, the interest is centred simply on the discovery of the biases which could impede the full unfolding of the bargainers’ rationality. The article reconsiders the most important contributions in the bargaining literature in order to sketch out a richer and more articulate model of a strategic-cognitive nature. According to such a model, the most important bargaining decisions that the bargainers assume, are taken on the representations of the situation which they derive directly from their belief systems; during the bargaining the parties do not only reply to the moves and the strategies of their interlocutors so discovering the true structure of the game in a simply adaptive perspective but they also act strategically in order to construct their field of action, redefining both their own stakes and bargaining power. This view restores freedom and responsibility to the bargainers and involves their ability to construct effective representations, to activate analogies and metaphors capable to give a structuring (or to provoke a re-structuring) of the game which promote positive outcomes. The working hypotheses presented design a model with a more modest predictive capacity but with a greater capability to account for the bargaining strategies of complex parties, such to offer concrete guidelines for action and to formulate suggestions to the real bargainers, in a typically reflective theoretical perspective.