Robert stav ins on the carbon-pricing regime, the New York times , 1 june 2014: dodgy arguments

Titolo Rivista ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Autori/Curatori Michel Damian
Anno di pubblicazione 2014 Fascicolo 2014/1 Lingua Inglese
Numero pagine 9 P. 53-61 Dimensione file 127 KB
DOI 10.3280/EFE2014-001003
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This commentary discusses the opinion piece published on 1 June 2014 by Professor Robert Stavins in The New York Times. Professor Robert Stavins argues that "The Only Feasible Way of Cutting Emissions" is to set up a market for tradable permits. We review and criticize his mains arguments. Our purpose here is not to deny the possibility of carbon trading, but to call for a realistic assessment of the deployment of cap-and-trade systems and their limitations.

Keywords:Cap-and-trade, Command and control, Lead in gasoline, SO2 emissions, California AB32, Climate Change

Jel codes:H23, Q54, Q58

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  • Les grandes orientations de l’accord climatique de Paris 2015 Michel Damian, Mehdi Abbas, Pierre Berthaud, Catherine Aubertin, Michel Damian, Michel Magny, Claude Millier, Jacques Theys, Sébastien Treyer, in Natures Sciences Sociétés /2015 pp.S19
    DOI: 10.1051/nss/2015015

Michel Damian, Robert stav ins on the carbon-pricing regime, the New York times , 1 june 2014: dodgy arguments in "ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT" 1/2014, pp 53-61, DOI: 10.3280/EFE2014-001003