Reputazione e soluzioni di equilibrio nei contratti tra acquirenti e fornitori di servizi sanitari
Titolo Rivista: ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Autori/Curatori: Marcello Montefiori
Anno di pubblicazione: 2001 Fascicolo: 5 Lingua: Italiano
Numero pagine: 34
Dimensione file: 172 KB
This paper aims to verify the role of reputation in contracting for health care services. First of all we define the dynamic equation for the reputation. Then it is necessary to build an intertemporal model using a current value Hamiltonian. The model works under the hypothesis that the demand for health services does not reflect neither the quality of the service nor the reputation of the provider. The final goal is to check, in relation to the contract type implemented by providers and purchasers of health services, whether reputation allows for equilibrium outcomes characterised by quality levels and effort to reduce costs above the minimum enforceable level. JEL I11 I18
Marcello Montefiori, in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 5/2001, pp. , DOI:
