Click here to download

Potere di mercato, prezzi predatori e comportamento anticoncorrenziale dell'impresa pubblica
Author/s: Giuseppe Clerico 
Year:  2002 Issue: Language: Italian 
Pages:  20 FullText PDF:  93 KB

Profit maximizing firms can achieve a monopoly position by means of the predatory pricing. Afterwards, the reduction of competition, the private firm can recoup losses through a price higher than the marginal cost. Such an anticompetitive behaviour can be practiced by public enterprise as well. They can follow such strategy in particular when they try and maximize output. However, the public enterprise, having drastically reduced the competition, does not have, generally, any incentive to adopt a price higher than the marginal cost. A similar price, indeed, could incentive the entry of new competitors. Seemingly, the policy followed by the public firm benefits the consumers. In reality, with respect to the economic system as a whole, such a behaviour of the public enterprise can cause an inefficient resource allocation and perverse incentives to the private agents when the public firm benefits of public transfers financed by a general taxation. As public firms have incentives to limit competition, the Antitrust Agency has to intervent to restore and strengthen the competition.

Giuseppe Clerico, in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 3/2002, pp. , DOI:


FrancoAngeli is a member of Publishers International Linking Association a not for profit orgasnization wich runs the CrossRef service, enabing links to and from online scholarly content