In the latest literature, the extensive catalogue of subjective rights has been enriched with a new category, that of the Relational Rights, or Rights of Relation. These rights are mentioned with regard to specific groups, in particular the family, but some authors mention them with regard to every context where interpersonal relationships are developed. It follows that fundamental rights should also be construed as relational rights. The article expounds on the distinctive traits of this category of rights, which has been elaborated primarily by scholars with a feminist orientation in the framework of their work about the ethics of care, then analyses the premises underlying the perspective of relational rights, highlighting in particular their connections with the critique of the individualistic basis of human rights. The author also stresses that this perspective clashes significantly with such doctrines as solidarity and transpersonalism and also with critical thinking about how rights make their way into the vital world. Lastly, she questions the implications of the transposition of relational rights in the framework of the institutional treatment of conflicts, with a specific focus on family and juvenile justice.