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Psychologism and the Pragmatists: Peirce and Dewey
Journal Title: PARADIGMI 
Author/s: Christopher Hookway 
Year:  2010 Issue: Language: English 
Pages:  11 Pg. 45-55 FullText PDF:  271 KB
DOI:  10.3280/PARA2010-003004
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Throughout his philosophical writings, and especially after 1903, Peirce insisted that logic should make no use of information from psychology, biology and other sciences. This view was not shared by all pragmatists. Dewey’s Studies in Logical Theory (1903) sought to make peace between logic and psychology by using Darwinian ideas to interpret logic as the natural history of thought. The paper explores the arguments that Peirce used to criticize Dewey’s position, discussing how he thought that its acceptance would be an impediment to the rational criticism of our ideas. It also attempts to understand Peirce’s reasons for claiming that Dewey’s position "forbids" all such researches as those that Peirce had carried out for eighteen years.
Keywords: Dewey, Instrumentalism, Logic, Peirce, Pragmatists, Psychologism

Christopher Hookway, in "PARADIGMI" 3/2010, pp. 45-55, DOI:10.3280/PARA2010-003004


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