Wilfrid Sellars claimed Kantian intuitions to be ambiguous: an intuition, on one reading, is an Aristotelian "this-such". This offers a way around familiar problems faced by John McDowell’s otherwise Sellarsian (and Kantian) account of perceptual content. McDowell considers but rejects Sellars’s suggestion, but the problem Mc- Dowell identifies with it can be circumvented by modifying Sellars’s account by treating perceptual content as "propositional" in the Aristotelian sense of "prótasis". This affords a solution to problems of McDowell’s account of perception, but also shows why Kant needed another "face" to his ambiguous notion of intuition. Sellars’s reading of Kant here shows parallels with that of Hegel.
Keywords: Sellars, Kant, Aristotle, McDowell, Intuition, Perception.