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Law, transaction costs and coase’s institutions. A reappraisal
Author/s: Massimiliano Vatiero 
Year:  2013 Issue: Language: English 
Pages:  8 Pg. 147-154 FullText PDF:  90 KB
DOI:  10.3280/POLI2013-004006
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The main contribution of Coase1 is having proven that no institution is a free lunch (among others, Pagano, 2012). It means that every institution (e.g. the market and the firm) has non-null costs of functioning, i.e. transaction costs. In a world with positive transaction costs, the policy-making process has to rest on a meticulous comparative analysis of alternative institutional arrangements. In this respect, Ronald Coase has defined and developed a theory of choices among institutional solutions. The aim of this brief work is to highlighting, therefore, the strict correlation among transaction costs, institutions and law.
Keywords: Ronald Coase, institution, firm, market, transaction costs
Jel Code: K11, B52, D21

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Massimiliano Vatiero, in "ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE " 4/2013, pp. 147-154, DOI:10.3280/POLI2013-004006


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