Meinong has become a central reference point in the contemporary revival of realism. However, prima facie, it might seem paradoxical to call him a realist since he explicitly wanted to do away with any kind of "bias in favor of reality". It is therefore worth asking in which sense the Theory of Object, as far as it resolutely goes beyond reality, can be characterized as essentially realist. As a Brentanist the Austrian philosopher endorsed a strong realism with regard to empirical reality; in his view, this is the proper object of metaphysics. However, it seems more difficult to make sense of his realism in respect of those objects that are not real - and, as a matter of fact, of every kind of object - which he calls ‘objectivism’. This paper investigates the real meaning of such ‘objectivism’ and sees in that stance, beyond its superficial (neo- )Kantian features, an anti-Copernican revolution in philosophy that proclaims the unconditional precedence of the object over thought. Reading Meinong thus helps us to understand better what realism is.
Keywords: Meinong, realism, object, metaphysics, theory of object