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Qualification, Awarding and Subcontracting in Public Procurement: What Can We Learn from Local Reforms?
Journal Title: ECONOMIA PUBBLICA  
Author/s: Francesco Decarolis, Cristina Giorgiantonio 
Year:  2014 Issue: Language: Italian 
Pages:  37 Pg. 28-64 FullText PDF:  211 KB
DOI:  10.3280/EP2014-001003
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The presence of a pervasive and evolving local regulation in the Italian public procurement offers a way to study the effects of a vast series of reforms involving firms qualifications, contracts awarding and subcontracting. This paper documents the legal aspects of these local regulations and, for some of these rules, exploits their changes over time to analyze their effects on firms participation, winning bids, renegotiations and subcontracts. The paper also investigates how the type and availability of data affects the robustness of the effects of the different reforms evaluated. Finally, it also compares the estimates obtained to those coming from the recent experimentation undertaken by the municipality of Turin regarding the auction formats..
Keywords: Public procurement, auctions, competition, federalism, subcontracts, renegotiation.
Jel Code: K23, L51, L90

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Francesco Decarolis, Cristina Giorgiantonio, Qualification, Awarding and Subcontracting in Public Procurement: What Can We Learn from Local Reforms? in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 1/2014, pp. 28-64, DOI:10.3280/EP2014-001003

   

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