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The Diffusion of Due Behaviour: A Note to Hayek’s Juridical Theory
Author/s: Salvatore Spagano 
Year:  2014 Issue: Language: Italian 
Pages:  14 Pg. 147-160 FullText PDF:  168 KB
DOI:  10.3280/EP2014-001007
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This work deals with an unresolved question left open by Hayek: which are the circumstances that lead to prefer a formalized rule to a spontaneous one? This paper suggests that spontaneous and formal rules do not cancel out each other, but are the results of two distinct approaches on just one reality, which did not catch its dynamic indivisibility. It is true that a behavioural rule survives thanks to its efficiency, but it is not true that the autopoiesis of the norm is efficient per se.
Keywords: Social norms, evolutionary economics, Hayek
Jel Code: A12, D02, K10

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Salvatore Spagano, The Diffusion of Due Behaviour: A Note to Hayek’s Juridical Theory in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 1/2014, pp. 147-160, DOI:10.3280/EP2014-001007


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