In this paper I aim to inquire about the problem of change within Husserl’s phenomenological conception of temporality. Through an overturn of the usual way with which Husserl’s theses are approached, firstly I intend to discuss about the different and articulated modes with which Husserl has progressively developed his awareness of the importance of a such question. I then try to underline in what way such awareness led Husserl to adopt a progressively more explicitly ontological approach. Such an ontological turn has important effects on the ways in which Husserl understands the notion of time in his later writings, insofar as terms such as transition, process, change, event and the like become central in order to characterize not only what happens, but also the very transcendental field of reference of happenings. In other words, Husserl progressively, though not without hesitations and afterthoughts, gets to consider the very transcendental structure of manifestation of phenomena in terms of process. Ultimately the becoming of the transcendental thus becomes, if not the certain port, at least a visible goal for the phenomenological reflection on temporality. In this respect this paper suggests the opportunity to understand such perspective under the general and synthetic label of metamorphosis, that is, structural processual change.
Keywords: Phenomenology, ontology, process, time, change.