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Husserl and the Problem of the Phenomenal Consciousness
Journal Title: PARADIGMI 
Author/s: Roberta Lanfredini 
Year:  2014 Issue: 3 Language: Italian 
Pages:  18 Pg. 55-72 FullText PDF:  84 KB
DOI:  10.3280/PARA2014-003005
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The hard problem of the philosophy of mind - i.e. the problem of internal phenomenal content of perception (qualia) - is still considered, for the most, unsolvable. This paper deals with a phenomenological analysis of the main problems linked with the puzzling qualia problem. These problems are: i) the relationship between intentional mind and consciousness, ii) the epistemological and ontological reductionism, iii) the anti-reductionist naturalism, iiii) the eliminativism, iiiii) the embodied and ecological mind. The paper main conclusion is that phenomenology is different mainly from a methological point of view, adopting a horizontal and integrated model in place of a vertical and dichotomic one.
Keywords: Qualia, consciousness, intentionality, reductionism, embodied mind, integrated model.

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Roberta Lanfredini, Husserl and the Problem of the Phenomenal Consciousness in "PARADIGMI" 3/2014, pp. 55-72, DOI:10.3280/PARA2014-003005

   

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