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Normativity and collective recognition in Searle’s account of language and institutions
Titolo Rivista: PARADIGMI 
Autori/Curatori: Francesca Di Lorenzo Ajello 
Anno di pubblicazione:  2015 Fascicolo: Lingua: Italiano 
Numero pagine:  23 P. 155-177 Dimensione file:  92 KB
DOI:  10.3280/PARA2015-001011
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Prendendo le mosse dalla tesi di John Searle che le istituzioni sono create e mantenute grazie al riconoscimento collettivo di funzioni di status secondo la forma logica "X conta come Y in C£, l’autrice del saggio analizza il ruolo cruciale delle regole costitutive nel percorso teorico searleano da Speech Acts a Making the Social World. Rendendo esplicito il parallelismo tra le regole costitutive che sottendono la realtà istituzionale e quelle che governano gli atti linguistici, l’autrice mira a derivare da esse i criteri normativi per la valutazione razionale sia degli atti linguistici sia degli atti istituzionali. Mostra come tali criteri consentano di distinguere tra riconoscimento collettivo razionalmente motivato e riconoscimento basato solo su tacita acquiescenza, quale quello che consente la sussistenza dei regimi totalitari


Keywords: Accordo razionale, Atti linguistici, Ontologia sociale, Regole costitutive, Searle.

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Francesca Di Lorenzo Ajello, in "PARADIGMI" 1/2015, pp. 155-177, DOI:10.3280/PARA2015-001011

   

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