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On the Theoretical Background of Cosciani’s Tax Reform
Titolo Rivista: ECONOMIA PUBBLICA  
Autori/Curatori: Alessandro Petretto 
Anno di pubblicazione:  2014 Fascicolo: Lingua: Inglese 
Numero pagine:  21 P. 59-79 Dimensione file:  187 KB
DOI:  10.3280/EP2014-003004
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The aim of this paper is to underline the theoretical foundations of the Report "Stato dei lavori della Commissione per lo studio della riforma tributaria" (hereafter CSRT, 1964) with reference to the second objective of the reform itself, i.e. to realize an "equalizing, efficient and transparent progressivity of the Italian tax system". CSRT (1964), as a White Paper directed to the Treasury, could not dwell on designing the theoretical foundations of the proposals, but, at the end, these ones stand out. In looking at them, the author finds a sort of ideal theoretical "bridge" between the main scholars of Italian tradition of public finance, Haig and Simons, Richard Musgrave and James Mirrlees. In any case, the CSRT (1964) fiscal proposals are characterized by a great pragmatism and concreteness within the specific Italian institutional setting.

ABSTRACT Scopo del lavoro è delineare i presupposti teorici del Rapporto curato dalla Commissione per lo Studio della Riforma Tributaria (CSRT, 1964), con riferimento al secondo degli obiettivi posti alla base della riforma stessa, ovvero la realizzazione di "una progressività perequata, efficiente e trasparente del sistema tributario italiano". CSRT (1964), per sua natura di rapporto tecnico al ministro, non poteva tracciare compiutamente le basi teoriche sedimentate, che, tuttavia, alla fine vengono fuori. Nel delineare queste, l’autore propone di gettare una sorta di "ponte" teorico ideale tra i contributi seminali di Haig-Simons, Musgrave e Mirrlees, sulla base dei legami che si possono intravedere nel Rapporto. Nelle proposte risulta evidente anche l’influenza della Tradizione Italiana di Scienza delle Finanze che ha ispirato la formazione culturale degli economisti della Commissione Cosciani.
Keywords: Progressività; equità; efficienza; imposta personale sul reddito
Jel Code: B150, H200

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Alessandro Petretto, Sui presupposti teorici della riforma tributaria di Cosciani in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 3/2014, pp. 59-79, DOI:10.3280/EP2014-003004

   

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