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FORMALIZING DARWINISM, NATURALIZING MATHEMATICS
Titolo Rivista: PARADIGMI 
Autori/Curatori: Fabio Sterpetti 
Anno di pubblicazione:  2015 Fascicolo: 2 Lingua: Italiano 
Numero pagine:  28 P. 133-160 Dimensione file:  125 KB
DOI:  10.3280/PARA2015-002009
Il DOI è il codice a barre della proprietà intellettuale: per saperne di più:  clicca qui   qui 


Negli ultimi decenni due diverse e apparentemente non correlate linee di ricerca hanno connesso sempre di più la matematica e l’evoluzionismo. Infatti, da una parte si sono avuti diversi tentativi di formalizzare il darwinismo mentre dall’altra diversi tentativi di naturalizzare la logica e la matematica sono stati posti in essere. Tali ricerche possono apparire o completamente indipendenti, oppure convergenti. Possono in effetti sembrare supportare entrambe una concezione naturalistica. L’evoluzionismo è infatti cruciale per una visione naturalistica e formalizzarlo sembra essere un modo per rafforzare la sua scientificità. Al contrario, si metterà in luce come tali linee di ricerca possono essere viste come contrastanti, dato che la concezione della conoscenza cui si rifanno può essere messa in discussione dalla adozione di una prospettiva evoluzionistica.


Keywords: Conoscenza, matematica, naturalismo, realismo scientifico, verità.

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Fabio Sterpetti, Formalizzare il darwinismo, naturalizzare la matematica in "PARADIGMI" 2/2015, pp. 133-160, DOI:10.3280/PARA2015-002009

   

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