Click here to download

Consciousness, illusory freedom, double feel
Journal Title: PARADIGMI 
Author/s: Giuseppe Trautteur 
Year:  2015 Issue: Language: English 
Pages:  12 Pg. 11-22 FullText PDF:  71 KB
DOI:  10.3280/PARA2015-003002
(DOI is like a bar code for intellectual property: to have more infomation:  clicca qui   and here 

There is a very large amount of publications on the subject of consciousness, both of a scholarly nature as well as of trade book format, going back at least to Descartes and Spinoza and already admirably expressed by Huxley (1874). The modern consensus is that the technical difficulties, but even more the methodological difficulties that are involved in theorizing about consciousness, are so different from run of the mill scientific enterprises as to demand for a complete reassessment of what it means to know and to explain. Taking as an unexplained datum the first person experience of consciousness, the following unorderly remarks attempt at extracting assessed or accepted pieces of third person knowledge about phenomenal consciousness, while guardedly identifying those that are less secure or even found to be groundless. Furthermore free will, a component of the layman’s common understanding of a conscious subject, will be cleaved from phenomenal consciousness and found missing. There, what remains to be explained is the incorrigible conscious illusion of a free choice, and the consequences - ethical, juridical, and psychological - of such illusion. .
Keywords: Consciousness, First person, Free will, Illusion, Methodology, Third person

  1. Baars B. (1997). In the theater of consciousness: the workspace of the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press., DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195102659.001.1
  2. Beck F. and Eccles J. (1992). Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 89: 145-165., DOI: 10.1073/pnas.89.23.11357
  3. Block N. (1978). Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 9: 261-325.
  4. Block N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227-287., DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00038188
  5. Block N. (2009). Comparing the major theories of consciousness. In: Gazzaniga M., ed. The cognitive neurosciences IV. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press: 1111-1123.
  6. Brass M. and Haggard P. (2007). To do or not to do: the neural signature of self-control. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 34: 9141-9145., DOI: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0924-07.2007
  7. Brillouin L. (1956). Science and information theory. New York: Academic Press.
  8. Chalmers D. (1996). The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
  9. Churchland Paul and Churchland Patricia (1998). On the contrary: critical essays, 1987-1997. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
  10. Cordeschi R., Tamburrini G. and Trautteur G. (1999). The notion of loop in the study of consciousness. In: Taddei-Ferretti C. and Musio C., eds. Neuronal bases and psychological aspects of consciousness. Singapore: World Scientific: 524-540., DOI: 10.1142/9789814313254_0050
  11. Damasio A. (1999). The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness. New York: Harcout Brace.
  12. Damasio A. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: joy, sorrow and the feeling brain. Orlando: Harcourt Inc.
  13. Dehaene S. (2014). Consciousness and the brain: deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. New York: Viking Press.
  14. Dennett D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
  15. Dennett D. and Kinsbourne M. (1992). Time and the observer: the where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15: 183-247., DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00068229
  16. Derrida J. (2006). L’animal que donc je suis. Paris: Editions Galilée.
  17. Fenigstein A., Scheier M.F. and Buss A.H. (1975), Public and private self-consciousness: assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 4: 522-527.
  18. Frankfurt H.G. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66, 23: 829-839., DOI: 10.2307/2023833
  19. Giacino J.T., Ashwal S., Childs N., Cranford R., Jennett B., Katz D.I., Kelly J.P., Rosenberg J.H., Whyte J., Zafonte R.D. and Zasler N.D. (2000). The minimally conscious state: definition and diagnostic criteria. Neurology, 58, 3: 349-353., DOI: 10.1212/WNL.58.3.349
  20. Gray J.A. (1995). The contents of consciousness: a neuropsychological conjecture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 659-676., DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00040395
  21. Gray J.A. (2004). Consciousness: creeping up on the hard problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  22. Hagan S., Hameroff S. and Tuszynski J. (2002). Quantum computation in brain microtubules? Decoherence and biological feasibility. Physical Review, 65: 6., DOI: 10.1103/physreve.65.061901
  23. Hofstadter D. (2007). I am a strange loop. New York: Basic Books.
  24. Huxley T.H. (1874). On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history. In: Huxley T.H. (2011). Collected essays, Volume 1, methods and results. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 199-250.
  25. Koch C. (2004). The quest for consciousness: a neurobiological approach. Englewood: Roberts and Co.
  26. Kornhuber H.H. and Deecke L. (1965). Hirnpotentialänderungen bei willkürbewegungen und passiven bewegungen des menschen: bereitschaftspotential und reafferente potentiale. Pflügers Arch., 284, 1-17., DOI: 10.1007/BF00412364
  27. Kurzweil R. (2005). The singularity is near. New York: Viking Press.
  28. Libet B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 4: 529-539.
  29. Llinás R. (2001). I of the vortex: from neurons to self. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
  30. Lonergan B. (1957). Insight: A study of human understanding. London: Longmans.
  31. Minsky M. (1968). Matter, mind, and models. In: Minsky M., Semantic information processing. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
  32. Mandler G. (2002). Consciousness recovered: psychological functions and origins of conscious thought. Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins., DOI: 10.1075/aicr.40
  33. McGinn C. (2004). Consciousness and its objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press., DOI: 10.1093/019926760X.001.0001
  34. Nagel T. (1986), The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  35. Nagel T. (2012). Mind and cosmos: why the materialist neo-darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false. Oxford: Oxford University Press., DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199919758.001.0001
  36. O’Regan J. K. (2011). Why red doesn’t sound like a bell. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  37. Penrose R. (2002). The emperor’s new mind. Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks.
  38. Schooler J.W., Hunt T. and Schooler J.N (2011), Reconsidering the metaphysics of science from the inside out. In: Walach H., Schmidt S. and Wayne B.J., eds. Neuroscience, consciousness and spirituality, Springer Science & Business Media: 157-94., DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-2079-4_11
  39. Shannon C.E. and McCarthy J., eds. (1956). Automata studies. Annals of Mathematics Studies, 34: Princeton University Press: 3-41.
  40. Searle J.R. (2000). Consciousness, free action and the brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 10: 3-22.
  41. Singer P. and Cavalieri P., eds. (1993). The great ape project: equality beyond humanity. London: Fourth Estate.
  42. Stajic J., Stone R., Chin G. and Wible B. (2015). Rise of the Machines. Science, 349: 248-278., DOI: 10.1126/science.349.6245.248
  43. Teasdale G. and Jennett B. (1974). Assessment of come and impaired consciousness: a pratical scale. The Lancet, 304, 7872: 81-84., DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(74)91639-0
  44. Tononi G. (2012). Phi: a voyage from the brain to the soul. USA: Random House.
  45. Wegner D.M. (2003). The illusion of conscious will. Bradford, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
  46. Wegner D.M. (2003), The mind’s best trick: How we experience conscious will. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7: 65-69., DOI: 10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00002-0

Giuseppe Trautteur, in "PARADIGMI" 3/2015, pp. 11-22, DOI:10.3280/PARA2015-003002


FrancoAngeli is a member of Publishers International Linking Association a not for profit orgasnization wich runs the CrossRef service, enabing links to and from online scholarly content