There is a very large amount of publications on the subject of consciousness, both of a scholarly nature as well as of trade book format, going back at least to Descartes and Spinoza and already admirably expressed by Huxley (1874). The modern consensus is that the technical difficulties, but even more the methodological difficulties that are involved in theorizing about consciousness, are so different from run of the mill scientific enterprises as to demand for a complete reassessment of what it means to know and to explain. Taking as an unexplained datum the first person experience of consciousness, the following unorderly remarks attempt at extracting assessed or accepted pieces of third person knowledge about phenomenal consciousness, while guardedly identifying those that are less secure or even found to be groundless. Furthermore free will, a component of the layman’s common understanding of a conscious subject, will be cleaved from phenomenal consciousness and found missing. There, what remains to be explained is the incorrigible conscious illusion of a free choice, and the consequences - ethical, juridical, and psychological - of such illusion.
Keywords: Consciousness, First person, Free will, Illusion, Methodology, Third person