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«I’ll show you a thing we humans do». Facts of life in Wittgenstein and Peirce
Titolo Rivista: PARADIGMI 
Autori/Curatori: Anna Boncompagni 
Anno di pubblicazione:  2016 Fascicolo: Lingua: Inglese 
Numero pagine:  15 P. 51-65 Dimensione file:  175 KB
DOI:  10.3280/PARA2016-003004
Il DOI è il codice a barre della proprietà intellettuale: per saperne di più:  clicca qui   qui 


The paper compares the way in which Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce deal with "facts of life", or the ordinary. Starting from the former’s well-known remark on forms of life as "the given", it shows its proximity to some themes also explored by Peirce. This leads to examine in more detail the Peircean notion of habit and its connection with the everyday, an aspect on which the two philosophers bear interesting similarities. The examination of the only remark Wittgenstein expressed on Peirce, still largely neglected in literature, also highlights relevant differences. The paper concludes on how, differences notwithstanding, both thinkers consider "facts of life" as the proper terrain of philosophical activity.

L’articolo paragona il modo in cui Ludwig Wittgenstein e Charles S. Peirce trattano dei "fatti della vita", ovvero dell’ordinario. Partendo dalla nota osservazione wittgensteiniana sulle forme di vita come "il dato", se ne mostra la vicinanza con alcuni temi propri di Peirce, in particolare con la nozione di abito, strettamente legata alla questione del quotidiano. Su questo i due filosofi manifestano un atteggiamento simile. L’esame dell’unica osservazione che Wittgenstein ha espresso su Peirce, largamente ignorata in letteratura, illustra però anche alcune divergenze. Il saggio si chiude sottolineando come nonostante le differenze entrambi i pensatori trovino nei "fatti della vita" il terreno proprio della riflessione filosofica.
Keywords: Wittgenstein, Peirce, Forme di vita, Abito, Fatti della vita.

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Anna Boncompagni, «Vi mostrerò una cosa che fanno gli umani». Fatti della vita in Wittgenstein e Peirce in "PARADIGMI" 3/2016, pp. 51-65, DOI:10.3280/PARA2016-003004

   

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