Clicca qui per scaricare

Understanding rules as habits. Developing a pragmatist anthropological approach
Titolo Rivista: PARADIGMI 
Autori/Curatori: Roberta Dreon 
Anno di pubblicazione:  2016 Fascicolo: Lingua: Inglese 
Numero pagine:  15 P. 103-117 Dimensione file:  191 KB
DOI:  10.3280/PARA2016-003007
Il DOI è il codice a barre della proprietà intellettuale: per saperne di più:  clicca qui   qui 


By taking Wittgenstein’s well-known reflections on following a rule as its starting point, the paper suggests that what the Austrian philosopher meant by rule could better be understood in terms of habits, as these have been theorized by the classical pragmatists – and by John Dewey in particular. This kind of interpretation reinforces both the rejection of the intellectualistic approach to the issue of following rules, and the emphasis on their primarily social dimension. On the other hand, this reading also forces us to clarify what the anthropological consequences might be of Wittgenstein’s leap from the dichotomy between the alleged a priori norms and their alleged empirical actualizations to our already meaningful ordinary practices. Consequently, the paper articulates the basic anthropological assumptions characterizing the pragmatist approach to habits by stressing their natural and social implications. Finally, the author outlines what the consequences might be of this interpretation of rules in terms of habits for the question of normativity.

Prendendo avvio dalle note riflessioni di Wittgenstein sul problema del "seguire una regola", il saggio sostiene che la proposta del filosofo austriaco potrebbe essere compresa meglio traducendo regole con abiti e intendendo questi ultimi nei termini in cui furono concepiti dai pragmatisti classici - e da John Dewey in particolare. Questo tipo di interpretazione rinforza sia il rifiuto dell’approccio intellettualistico al problema delle regole, sia l’enfasi sulla loro dimensione primariamente sociale. D’altra parte, l’autrice riconosce esplicitamente che questo tipo di lettura forza Wittgenstein a rendere chiare quali potrebbero essere le conseguenze sul piano antropologico del suo salto dalla dicotomia tra le presunte norme a priori e le loro presunte realizzazioni empiriche alle nostre pratiche ordinarie già di per sé significative. Pertanto il saggio articola le assunzioni antropologiche che caratterizzano l’approccio pragmatista agli abiti, sottolineandone le implicazioni naturali e sociali. In conclusione l’autrice accenna alle conseguenze che questo tipo di interpretazione delle regole in termini di abiti possono avere per la questione della normatività
Keywords: Abiti, Regole, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Antropologia

  1. Andronico M. (1998). Antropologia e metodo morfologico: studio su Wittgenstein. Napoli: La città del sole.
  2. Bernstein R. (2010). The pragmatic turn. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  3. Borutti S. (1985). Wittgenstein e l’orizzonte antropologico della regola. Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine, 3, 3/4: 9-15,
  4. Bourdieu P. (1972). Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique précédé de Trois études d’ethnologie kabyle. Paris: Seuil.
  5. Bourdieu P. (1980). Le sens pratique. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.
  6. Brandom R. (1994). Making it explicit. Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  7. Calcaterra R.M. (2016). Constructing on contingency: William James from biology to ethics and politics. Cognitio, 13,1: 219-231.
  8. Colapietro V. (2004). Doing – and undoing – the done thing: Dewey and Bourdieu on habituation, agency, and transformation. Contemporary Pragmatism, 1, 2: 65-93,, DOI: 10.1163/18758185-90000141
  9. Cometti J.-P. (2008). Qu’est-ce qu’une règle. Éducation et Didactique, 2, 2: 141-150,
  10. Dewey J. (1976). Interpretation of savage mind. In: The middle works, 1899-1924, Volume 2: 1902-1903, Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press: 39-52.
  11. Dewey J. (1988a). Human nature and conduct. The middle works, 1899-1924, Volume 14: 1922, Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.
  12. Dewey J. (1988b). The vanishing subject in the psychology of James. In: The later works, 1925-1953, Volume 14: 1939-1941, Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press: 155-167.
  13. Dewey J. (1989). Art as experience. The later works, 1925-1953, Volume 10: 1934, Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.
  14. Diamond C. (1983). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Philosophical Books, 24, 2: 96-98,
  15. Dreon R (2010). John Dewey: l’abito fa il naturalismo culturale. Bollettino Filosofico, XXVI: 169-182.
  16. James W. (1981). The principles of psychology. 2 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  17. Kestenbaum V. (1992). Meaning on the model of truth. Dewey and Gadamer on habit and Vorurteil. The Journal of Speculative Psychology. New Series, 6, 1: 25-66.
  18. Kripke A.S. (1982). On rules and private language. Oxford: Blackwell.
  19. Leary D.E. (2013). A moralist in an age of scientific analysis and skepticism: habit in the life and work of William James. In: Sparrow T. and Hutchinson A., eds. A history of habit. From Aristotle to Bourdieu. Plymouth: Lexington Books: 177-208.
  20. MacMullan T. (2013). The fly wheel of society. habit and social meliorism in the pragmatist tradition. In: Sparrow T. and Hutchinson A., eds. A history of habit. From Aristotle to Bourdieu. Plymouth: Lexington Books: 229-253.
  21. Margolis J. (1999). Relativism and cultural relativity. In: What, after all, is a work of art? Lectures in the philosophy of art. University Park, PA: The Pennsilvania State University Press: 41-66.
  22. Margolis J. (2002). Reinventing pragmatism. American philosophy at the end of the twentieth century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  23. McDowell J. (1984). Wittgenstein on following a rule. Synthèse, 58, 3, Essays on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: 325-363.
  24. Mead G.H. (2011a), Social psychology as counterpart to physiological psychology. In: Deegan M.J., ed. Essays in social psychology. New Brunswick-London: Transaction Publishers: 9-17.
  25. Mead G.H. (2011b), The relation of the embryological development to education. In: Deegan M.J., ed. Essays in social psychology. New Brunswick-London: Transaction Publishers: 73-82.
  26. Mithen S., Parsons L. (2008). The brain as cultural artifact. Cambridge Archeological Journal, 18, 3: 415-422,
  27. Perissinotto L. (1997). Wittgenstein. Una guida. Milano: Feltrinelli.
  28. Rofena C. (2011). Wittgenstein e l’errore di Frazer. Etica morfologica ed estetica antropologica. Milano-Udine: Mimesis.
  29. Shusterman R. (2008). Redeeming somatic reflection: John Dewey’s somatic philosophy of body-mind. In: Body consciousness. A philosophy of mindfuless and somaesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 180-216.
  30. Sullivan S. (2013). Oppression in the gut. The biological dimensions of Deweyan habit. In: Sparrow T. and Hutchinson A., eds. A history of habit. From Aristotle to Bourdieu. Plymouth: Lexington Books: 255-271.
  31. Winch P. (1990; 2nd ed.). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy. London: Routledge.
  32. Wittgenstein L. (1953). Philosophical investigations, ed. by G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, Oxford: Blackwell.

Roberta Dreon, Comprendere le regole come abiti. Un approccio antropologico di tipo pragmatista in "PARADIGMI" 3/2016, pp. 103-117, DOI:10.3280/PARA2016-003007

   

FrancoAngeli è membro della Publishers International Linking Association associazione indipendente e no profit per facilitare l'accesso degli studiosi ai contenuti digitali nelle pubblicazioni professionali e scientifiche