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The influence of enforcement of contract on the quality of performance in public procurement: a theoretical overview
Journal Title: ECONOMIA PUBBLICA  
Author/s: Guido Tatone 
Year:  2016 Issue: Language: Italian 
Pages:  23 Pg. 107-129 FullText PDF:  233 KB
DOI:  10.3280/EP2016-002004
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This paper is a review of recent approaches to the analysis of public procurement problems where the quality is not perfectly assessable. First, we show the main results of models which analyse a similar issue in a competitive market framework. Then we analyse the papers which face this subject in a context of public procurement using the concept of reputation for past behaviour as the basis to punish opportunistic sellers. In particular, we discuss Kim’s results (1998) about the leaving out of sellers with bad reputation from selective tenders, and Doni’s ones (2005) about the use by Public Administration of a policy for rewarding good reputation. Finally, we refer to the advantages arising from the adoption of "reputation-regarding" auctions (Tatone, 2007).
Keywords: Public procurement, auction theory, enforcement of contract, non-contractible quality
Jel Code: D82, H57, L14

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Guido Tatone, The influence of enforcement of contract on the quality of performance in public procurement: a theoretical overview in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 2/2016, pp. 107-129, DOI:10.3280/EP2016-002004

   

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