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Le cooperative di produzione e la stabilità occupazionale
Author/s: Flavio Delbono 
Year:  2016 Issue: 105 Language: Italian 
Pages:  13 Pg. 166-177 FullText PDF:  219 KB
DOI:  10.3280/QUA2016-105008
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In this paper I show that production cooperatives worry about their employees more than conventional firms, when hit by external shocks as under the recent crisis. A simple statistical analysis of a large sample of Italian production cooperatives allows to conclude that such firms try to stabilize employment and adjust pay during slums, whereas profit-seeking firms tend to fire workers. More generally, employment is less pro-cyclical within coops than elsewhere. Such stabilization is obtained also tanks to horizontal mergers among coops. Actually, simple theory shows that the well-known "merger paradox" does not apply to production cooperatives as for them a merger is valuable for any number of participating companies

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Flavio Delbono, in "QUADERNI DI ECONOMIA DEL LAVORO" 105/2016, pp. 166-177, DOI:10.3280/QUA2016-105008


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