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Action explanation, intensionality, and empathy. From Anscombe to Quine (via Davidson)
Journal Title: PARADIGMI 
Author/s: Antonio Rainone 
Year:  2017 Issue: Language: English 
Pages:  12 Pg. 199-210 FullText PDF:  205 KB
DOI:  10.3280/PARA2017-001014
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The paper discusses the problem of action explanation starting from some well-known theses of G.E.M. Anscombe about the concept of intention and the variety of descriptions of an action. Intentional descriptions of actions are those that embody the intention or reason why an action was performed. This thesis was supported also by Donald Davidson in his theory of action and the explanation of action by redescription. The significance of this thesis is emphasized here because it implies the intensionality of action explanation. And intensionality shows that action explanations which are instances of attribution of propositional attitudes are largely based on the method of empathic understanding, as it had been remarked by WV. Quine.
Keywords: Action, Empathy, Explanation, Intensionality, Intention, Propositional Attitudes.

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Antonio Rainone, in "PARADIGMI" 1/2017, pp. 199-210, DOI:10.3280/PARA2017-001014


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