This paper aims to examine the effect on the underpricing in Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of the corporate governance’s mechanisms designed to signal to the market and potential investors the company’s value, reducing the incidence of this anomaly. The meta-analysis is applied through the quantitative review of 42 paper. Decisions about the ownership structure, as well as the securities’ allocation among different investors, affecting the company’s value, influence the underpricing extent. In particular, the paper considers the influence on underpricing of the signals transmitted by going public company regarding ownership retention, insider ownership management, board composition. The companies going public with the support of prestigious underwriter and / or venture capitalists should be slightly underpricing due to reduced ex ante uncertainty. The meta-analysis’ results suggested possible research directions for examining the role of moderating variables.
Keywords: IPO, Underpricing, Underwriter reputation, Signaling, Governance.