Caratteristiche dell’Audit Committee e Gestione del Rischio Bancario: un’analisi empirica del contesto europeo

Titolo Rivista: MANAGEMENT CONTROL
Autori/Curatori: Davide Rizzotti, Claudia Frisenna
Anno di pubblicazione: 2017 Fascicolo: 2 Lingua: English
Numero pagine: 22 P. 125-146 Dimensione file: 537 KB
DOI: 10.3280/MACO2017-002007
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  • Strategic performance management systems in Italian banks. A research note Francesca Francioli, in MANAGEMENT CONTROL 2/2018 pp.155
    DOI: 10.3280/MACO2018-002008

Davide Rizzotti, Claudia Frisenna, Caratteristiche dell’Audit Committee e Gestione del Rischio Bancario: un’analisi empirica del contesto europeo in "MANAGEMENT CONTROL" 2/2017, pp 125-146, DOI: 10.3280/MACO2017-002007