The mimesis of regulative rules: repeal, money (M1) and institutional entities
Journal title SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO
Author/s Edoardo Fittipaldi
Publishing Year 2012 Issue 2012/2
Language Italian Pages 16 P. 53-78 File size 118 KB
DOI 10.3280/SD2012-002003
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In this essay, the author discusses three possible fields of research for Roversi’s concept of ‘institutional mimesis’. Before discussing them, he explains why he considers John Searle’s constitutive rules to be regulative rules whose ‘conditioning facts’ (what civil lawyers call Tatbestand or fattispecie) are provided with a nomen iuris. After this premise, Fittipaldi addresses the phenomenon of repeal and suggests that, when construed as an act of destruction, this phenomenon is capable of conveying certain deontological metaphorical implications. He then moves on to discuss how certain clusters and features of regulative rules may generate the illusory experience of freestanding institutional entities. Finally, he illustrates how certain rules concerned with M1 (bank money) actually mimic natural properties of M0 (physical money).
Keywords: Mimetism - Repeal - Institutional entities - Money - M1
Edoardo Fittipaldi, Mimetismo di norme regolative: abrogazione, denaro (M1) ed entità istituzionali in "SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO " 2/2012, pp 53-78, DOI: 10.3280/SD2012-002003