LIBRI DI SUSANNA DORIGONI

This article analyzes the pros and cons of ownership separation of the gas transportation network. This analysis is made with a specific test that confronts two pairs of different theoretical approaches on vertical integration. The result of this test shows that no uncontroversial solution can be offered to this problem, since all arguments (be them in favour or against) can be comfortably contrasted by a counterargument. In our view, an effective regulation would solve the problem, even though it has to be highlighted that ownership separation of the gas transportation network is not the key aspect of the gas industry. EU directives, in fact, cannot be applied where the biggest part of the value chain is produced, that is to say beyond the European borders, where an oligopoly operates. Due to its bargaining power, this oligopoly captures almost all the scarcity rent, reducing the scope for market liberalization.

LNG, Competition and Security of Supply: the Role of Shipping - In the last few years, one of the main concerns of European Union in the energetic field has been that of facilitating the safeguard of raw materials’ security of supply, especially that of natural gas. Import through LNG chain, that is, through the employment of LNG tankers for gas transportation, has been identified by the European Council as one of the instruments to achieve these goals. In fact, import via LNG does not require, for the importer, such investments as to determine an indissoluble physical tie between producer and buyer, as happens for transport via pipeline (Chernyavs’ka et al., 2002). In other words, investments in pipelines are very specific. Moreover, as they are made in order to support specific transactions, contracts usually take the form of long-term agreements with minimum offtake requirements (take or pay clauses): such contracts definitely contribute to the "cartelization" of the market, hindering competition. Unlike investments in pipelines, those in the LNG chain present a much lower degree of specificity: in fact, even though the construction of a regasification plant is generally tied to the stipulation of a long-term agreement (with take or pay clause), LNG chain costs have significantly decreased over time (until a few years ago) and, moreover, it is getting increasingly common that part of plant capacity is made available for spot transactions. What’s more, once the contract is expired and the investment is sunk, the importer may satisfy his gas supply needs on the basis of his relative gains. As far as LNG import contractual practices are concerned, significant changes have started to take places in the last few years, both in terms of agreements’ length - average duration has significantly decreased - and in terms of price indexation - in the most developed markets LNG price is tied to gas spot price (IEA, 2006). One of the many possible advantages of transport via LNG is that liquefied gas enables European importers to widen their gas suppliers portfolio. Increased possibilities of choice for importers, the widening of the group of exporting countries, and the increased integration of the European market, thanks to the possibility of redirecting cargoes depending on single countries’ supply-demand balance, would contribute decisively to security of supply, market globalization and competition (between importers) in the industry (IEA, 2004). Yet, it must be stressed that import via tanker appears to be competitive with import via pipe only for the medium-long distances. As far as LNG chain is concerned, the element that so far has attracted the least attention, though being not less important than the other two, is certainly shipping. Being the link between the producing/exporting country and the importing country, and having been subject to major changes in the last few years, it is particularly interesting to analyze it singularly, aiming to understand how it is linked to the other elements of LNG value chain, besides studying industry dynamics. This paper will address this issue, aiming also to understand what has been and what will be in the future the evolutionary trajectory of this segment, starting from an analysis of operative and planned gas tankers, their size, their routes and their contractual situation. This analysis can be useful to make hypothesis about the growth of the spot market and, consequently, of market liquidity.

Keywords: LNG, gas tankers, security of supply, competition, regasification plants, spot market, natural gas international trade

JEL classifications: L95, K12, F14, L11

Parole chiave: GNL, navi gasiere, sicurezza dell’approvvigionamento, competizione, rigassificatori, mercato spot, commercio internazionale di gas naturale

International Energy Marke - The paper analyzes recent market trends in the oil and natural gas sector. For the latter, a focus on the European gas market is then presented, whose consumption has grown considerably in these last ten years. As for the oil sector this paper investigates the key elements that have shaped its market in these years. As for oil consumption, we show that in these last 15 years China, India and the Middle East are the main responsible for the increase in World consumption. On the other hand, European OECD Countries have consistently reduced (almost 9%) their oil demand. This is due both to the dematerialization of their economy and their significant improvements in energy efficiency. As for energy intensity, in fact, Europe by far is the most efficient region in the World. On the other hand, OPEC has drastically raised its share of total production: at present the cartel accounts for more than 40% of overall production. OPEC members were the only producers to meet World’s needs as oil demand expanded. The difficulties of other producers to keep up with the demand originated in the nineties, when no investment in new production capacity was brought about due to low oil prices. In the end of 2008, anyway, recession has eased the situation: for the first time in fifteen years, demand has not grown, compared to 2007 consumption. Recession has also shrunk prices, which, as soon as the demand started decreasing, have collapsed by almost 70%. As for the gas sector, the paper focuses on the European market where, after ten years from the beginning of the liberalization process, competition is still missing. In particular, the paper discusses whether LNG can bring about the competition so desperately needed. Unlike investments in pipelines, those in the LNG chain present a much lower degree of specificity, since the importer is not physically tied with the producer; moreover, it is getting increasingly common that part of the plant capacity is made available for spot transactions. It is also worth mentioning that for the time being LNG seems to represent the sole possibility for new competitors to enter the market according to the lack of capacity on international import pipelines. Long term import take or pay contracts held by gas incumbents play a pre-emption activity on transit pipelines and access can not be granted to third parties. Moreover, LNG could enable traditional European importers to widen their gas suppliers’ portfolio, also considering that some producing countries (i.e. stranded gas) can be reached only via sea. Increased possibilities of choice for importers, the widening of the group of exporting countries, and the increased integration of the European market, thanks to the possibility of redirecting cargoes depending on single countries’ supply-demand balance, would contribute decisively to security of supply, market globalization and competition in the industry. The paper presents also a cost plus comparison among different LNG supplies and those from new Russian fields, demonstrating that LNG will be even more convenient than those supplies coming from Eastern Siberia. Finally, it is important to highlight that the lack in new liquefaction capacity could undermine the growth of a florid LNG market.

Key words: Oil and gas sector, liberalization, LNG.

JEL classifications: Q40, Q41, Q43, Q48.

Parole chiave: Mercato del petrolio e del gas, liberalizzazione e GNL.

Il settore del gas europeo sta attraversando una fase di profonda trasformazione, riconducibile ai provvedimenti di liberalizzazione dei mercati. Con la Direttiva 98/30 il legislatore europeo ha inteso operare la transizione da un assetto di mercato fortemente concentrato e gerarchizzato ad un’organizzazione di tipo concorrenziale. Le previsioni inerenti la domanda italiana mostrano delta di consumo dell’ordine di circa 30 Gmc di qui al 2015. La domanda incrementale pone problemi di adeguamento delle grandi reti infrastrutturali di approvvigionamento. L’aumento della capacità di importazione può avvenire attraverso il potenziamento della rete di gasdotti già esistente, o per via della costruzione di nuovi terminali di rigassificazione. Tale scelta non appare tuttavia irrilevante dal punto di vista della implementazione della concorrenza, per la quale la filiera Gnl appare maggiormente funzionale. La realizzazione di nuovi terminali Gnl (gas naturale liquefatto) si presenta però maggiormente problematica dal punto di vista dell’impatto ambientale e territoriale rispetto ai gasdotti. Questa situazione configura perciò un possibile trade-off tra il conseguimento di un mercato concorrenziale nel settore del gas naturale ed il rispetto dell’ambiente. Ci proponiamo in questo lavoro di valutare la preferibilità dell’una o dell’altra soluzione tenendo conto delle diverse configurazioni di costo legate alle due filiere, nonché delle summenzionate istanze ambientali.

La convergenza tra i settori del gas naturale e dell’energia elettrica costituisce un fenomeno la cui determinante pare non essere più unicamente di tipo fisico-tecnologico, bensì legata alla contestuale liberalizzazione dei due mercati. La finalità del presente lavoro è appunto quella di analizzare in che rapporto si pongano la dinamica di convergenza e l’evoluzione del contesto istituzionale e normativo che caratterizzano ormai da tempo questi settori. Si cercherà in particolare di stabilire se, e in che misura, l’apertura dei mercati alla concorrenza sia da considerarsi una delle determinanti del processo di convergenza, e se quest’ultimo sia in grado di ostacolare il raggiungimento degli obiettivi cui le riforme tendono. L’analisi verrà in primo luogo condotta con riferimento al contesto europeo e, successivamente, a quello statunitense che, stanti il grado di avanzamento delle riforme e la numerosità delle iniziative di integrazione in atto, costituisce un laboratorio di indagine assolutamente privilegiato.

La tassazione sulle fonti energetiche in Europa costituisce da tempo oggetto di dibattito in sede comunitaria. L’obiettivo della recente proposta di direttiva (COM 97/30), relativa alla "ristrutturazione del quadro comunitario dell’imposizione sui prodotti energetici", è quello di promuovere un processo di convergenza quantitativa nei valori delle accise, e di rimuovere così uno dei vincoli all’effettiva implementazione della concorrenza sui mercati dell’energia, cui tendono i recenti provvedimenti di liberalizzazione, e, più in generale, alla creazione del mercato unico europeo. In questo articolo vengono dapprima considerate le disparità esistenti nei livelli di tassazione in vigore nei diversi stati membri, analizzando gli effetti che deriverebbero dall’applicazione della legge comunitaria che prevede soglie minime comuni di accisa su tutte le fonti di energia. Si discute poi dell’opportunità di usare la tassazione ambientale (basata sull’internazionalizzazione dei costi esterni legati alla produzione ed al consumo dell’energia) come criterio di convergenza, evidenziando i principali ostacoli che si frappongono all’adozione di un simile approccio, ma anche i rischi connessi ad un processo di armonizzazione che ne prescinda completamente.

Le criticità del processo di trasformazione in atto che poggiano sulla regolazione dei prezzi e sulla concorrenza per il mercato per l’affidamento della concessione da parte degli enti locali. Il testo ha in particolare rilevato come l’eccessiva discrezionalità da parte di questi ultimi nell’elaborazione delle regole che disciplinano il confronto competitivo tra gli operatori, e nella valutazione delle offerte, possa mettere a rischio la sicurezza dell’intero sistema.