Folk psychiatry. Psychiatry between a scientific and a popular image

Journal title PSICOTERAPIA E SCIENZE UMANE
Author/s Andrea Angelozzi
Publishing Year 2022 Issue 2022/3
Language Italian Pages 26 P. 431-546 File size 120 KB
DOI 10.3280/PU2022-003004
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Scientific research in psychiatry is creating a gap in the notions of psychiatry that ordinary people actually possess, similar to the progressive distance between scientific psychology and folk and commonsense psychology. The notions that scientific and folk psychiatry share, and those in which they often differ with counterintuitive aspects, are investigated. After outlining the essential features of the concept of common sense and popular psychology and their most representative theories, the central role that popular concepts play not only in psychiatric theory, in particular in diagnosis, but also in daily practice is underlined. These concepts also involve the image of one-self, of the world and interpersonal relationships, showing the impossibility of a psychiatry that aims to do without the common sense, and the need for a careful mediation with popular psychia-try. This aspect is even more important in practical psychiatry which in many ways is similar to popular psychiatry.

Keywords: Folk psychiatry; Folk psychology; Common sense; Scientific image; Scientific models

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Andrea Angelozzi, Folk psychiatry. La psichiatria fra immagine scientifica e psichiatria popolare in "PSICOTERAPIA E SCIENZE UMANE" 3/2022, pp 431-546, DOI: 10.3280/PU2022-003004