Approximate truth vs. empirical adequacy

Journal title EPISTEMOLOGIA
Author/s Seungbae Park
Publishing Year 2014 Issue 2014/1
Language English Pages 13 P. 106-118 File size 589 KB
DOI 10.3280/EPIS2014-001007
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Suppose that scientific realists believe that a successful theory is approximately true, and that constructive empiricists believe that it is empirically adequate. Whose belief is more likely to be false? The problem of underdetermination does not yield an answer to this question one way or the other, but the pessimistic induction does. The pessimistic induction, if correct, indicates that successful theories, both past and current, are empirically inadequate. It is arguable, however, that they are approximately true. Therefore, scientific realists overall take less epistemic risk than constructive empiricists.

Keywords: Approximate truth, empirical adequacy, pessimistic induction, underdetermination.

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Seungbae Park, Approximate truth vs. empirical adequacy in "EPISTEMOLOGIA" 1/2014, pp 106-118, DOI: 10.3280/EPIS2014-001007