Peirce and Wittgenstein Facing the Skeptic Challenge

Journal title PARADIGMI
Author/s Claudine Tiercelin
Publishing Year 2010 Issue 2010/3
Language French Pages 16 P. 13-28 File size 294 KB
DOI 10.3280/PARA2010-003002
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Peirce and Wittgenstein have shown that doubt, as much as belief, needs reasons. Both have close pragmatist views in their criticism of radical doubt, but have different answers. Whereas Wittgenstein wavers between a realistic and neo-pyrrhonian reaction, Peirce relies on a scientific and metaphysical version of realism and common sensism, yet remains so critical and fallibilistic that he keeps close to skepticism. The aim of the paper is to show the variety of the pragmatist parries to the skeptical challenge and the superiority of Peirce’s approach.

Peirce e Wittgenstein mostrano che il dubbio, come la credenza, ha bisogno di ragioni. Entrambi sviluppano le loro critiche al dubbio radicale secondo una prospettiva pragmatista, ma danno risposte diverse: Wittgenstein ondeggia tra una reazione realista e una pirronista, mentre Peirce sostiene una versione scientifica e metafisica del realismo e della filosofia del senso comune, rimanendo tuttavia così critico e fallibilista da tenersi solo a un passo dallo scetticismo. L’intento dell’articolo è di mostrare la varietà delle risposte pragmatiste alla sfida scettica e la superiorità della prospettiva peirceana.

Keywords: Critical Common Sense, Peirce, Pragmatism, Radical doubt, Scepticism, Wittgenstein

  • “Was Peirce a Genuine Anti-Psychologist in Logic?” Claudine Tiercelin, in European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy /2017
    DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.1003
  • «I'll show you a thing we humans do». Facts of life in Wittgenstein and Peirce Anna Boncompagni, in PARADIGMI 3/2017 pp.51
    DOI: 10.3280/PARA2016-003004

Claudine Tiercelin, Peirce et Wittgenstein face au défi sceptique in "PARADIGMI" 3/2010, pp 13-28, DOI: 10.3280/PARA2010-003002