The Meaning of Meaning in Peirce and Wittgenstein
Journal title PARADIGMI
Author/s Rossella Fabbrichesi
Publishing Year 2010 Issue 2010/3 Language Italian
Pages 15 P. 29-43 File size 282 KB
DOI 10.3280/PARA2010-003003
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The Author analyzes Peirce’s entanglement among continuity, vagueness, and generality and Wittgenstein’s treatment of vague propositions and meaning. Notwithstanding Wittgenstein’s dislike of any kind of pragmatism, he seems to be very close to it in his definition of meaning. He addresses meaning as a vague and inexact practice of reference, even though perfectly certain on a pragmatic ground, exactly as Peirce thought. There are notions, vague from a logical point of view but very precise in their operational handling and in the friction with their practical use.
Keywords: Continuity, Generality, Peirce, Pragmaticism, Vagueness, Wittgenstein
Rossella Fabbrichesi, Il significato del significato in Peirce e Wittgenstein in "PARADIGMI" 3/2010, pp 29-43, DOI: 10.3280/PARA2010-003003