Crime and Public Procurement, Evidence from Municipalities

Journal title ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Author/s Giuseppe Albanese, Federico Antellini Russo, Roberto Zampino
Publishing Year 2017 Issue 2016/2 Language Italian
Pages 37 P. 131-167 File size 369 KB
DOI 10.3280/EP2016-002005
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The paper analyzes the link between the centralized public procurement of goods and services by municipalities and the context in which these administrations operate. While taking into account a number of factors that can lead to a greater or lesser use of the Italian central purchasing body (Consip), the study focuses on the link between that choice and the local crime rate. The empirical analysis shows that, in low-crime areas only, an increase in crime is positively correlated with the frequency whereby municipalities choose suppliers selected by a third party in order to attempt to limit the risk of inefficiency (passive waste). The relationship reverses in high-crime areas, reflecting a growing inclination to maintain autonomous control over purchasing, potentially related to the possible extraction of rents (active waste).

Keywords: Crime, fraud and corruption, efficiency, public procurement, local public finance.

Jel codes: D73, E24, H57, H72, H83.

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Giuseppe Albanese, Federico Antellini Russo, Roberto Zampino, Criminalità e scelte degli amministratori locali in tema di procedure di acquisto in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 2/2016, pp 131-167, DOI: 10.3280/EP2016-002005