Audit Committee characteristics and Bank’s Risk Management. An empirical analysis of the European context

Journal title MANAGEMENT CONTROL
Author/s Davide Rizzotti, Claudia Frisenna
Publishing Year 2017 Issue 2017/2
Language Italian Pages 22 P. 125-146 File size 537 KB
DOI 10.3280/MACO2017-002007
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This paper examines how three Audit Committee characteristics (i.e., busyness, independence, and gender diversity) affect the effectiveness of its monitoring over bank risk taking and bank risk management strategies. It also explores whether country-cultural features shape the above relationships. Empirically, we analyse, using descriptive statistics and regression models, a sample of European commercial banks listed in the STOXX EUROPE 600 BANKS (ticker SX7P) between 1/1/2008 and 31/12/2013, investigating the direct impact of the Audit Committee characteristics on the bank risk taking, and the moderating effect on the risk-performance relation. In order to examine the role of national culture, we compare two subsamples of European countries, namely SIP (Spain, Italy and Portugal) and NON-SIP countries, characterized by different level of mutual social control, trust on stranger, and gender equality. Data regarding audit committee and board of directors were hand collected from each firm’s Internet site, while financial data concerning ROA, leverage, total assets and stock price series were collected from the Datastream database.

Keywords: Audit Committee, Bank Risk, Culture, Busyness, Independence, Gen-der diversity.

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  • Strategic performance management systems in Italian banks. A research note Francesca Francioli, in MANAGEMENT CONTROL 2/2018 pp.155
    DOI: 10.3280/MACO2018-002008

Davide Rizzotti, Claudia Frisenna, Caratteristiche dell’Audit Committee e Gestione del Rischio Bancario: un’analisi empirica del contesto europeo in "MANAGEMENT CONTROL" 2/2017, pp 125-146, DOI: 10.3280/MACO2017-002007