Aspetti epistemologici della neuropsichiatria cognitiva

Titolo Rivista PSICOTERAPIA E SCIENZE UMANE
Autori/Curatori Massimo Marraffa, Elisabetta Sirgiovanni
Anno di pubblicazione 2014 Fascicolo 2014/3
Lingua Italiano Numero pagine 22 P. 409-430 Dimensione file 322 KB
DOI 10.3280/PU2014-003003
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Scopo di questo articolo è discutere se e in quali modi le scienze neurocognitive possano fornire teorie, metodi e dati utili per la psichiatria. Nella prima parte dell’articolo viene presentato il progetto della neuropsichiatria cognitiva sullo sfondo dei mutamenti intervenuti negli ultimi trent’anni nei rapporti fra scienze psicologiche e neurologiche. Nella seconda parte viene esaminato lo stile esplicativo su più livelli della neuropsichiatria cognitiva, mostrandone il carattere di via media fra l’eccessiva insistenza riduzionista sulla parsimonia ontologica e l’unificazione della scienza e la rivendicazione antiriduzionista di una forte autonomia delle scienze speciali. Infine, la terza parte è dedicata all’analisi di un esemplare di spiegazione meccanicista in neuropsichiatria cognitiva: il tentativo di elaborare una spiegazione neurocognitiva del delirio di Capgras.;

Keywords:Neuroscienze cognitive, neuropsichiatria, meccanicismo, livelli di spiegazione, delirio

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Massimo Marraffa, Elisabetta Sirgiovanni, Aspetti epistemologici della neuropsichiatria cognitiva in "PSICOTERAPIA E SCIENZE UMANE" 3/2014, pp 409-430, DOI: 10.3280/PU2014-003003