How changes the European economic constitution between risk sharing and moral hazard

Author/s Giovanni Pitruzzella
Publishing Year 2018 Issue 2018/2
Language Italian Pages 12 P. 31-42 File size 195 KB
DOI 10.3280/DC2018-002003
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The essay examines some recent proposals for reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), underlining the main features of the ongoing development and its crucial issues. In particular, it is investigated how the overcoming of the Maastricht model of State Members’ financing and the growing intervention of EU in their economic policies determine a gap between decision makers and cost-bearers, with complex issues arises both on economical (i.e. moral hazard) and constitutional ground. Furthermore, it is outlined the position of Italy, which seems to require an efficient European ‘security net’ in order to face the risks connected to its chronic weakness in public finance and its low growth.

Keywords: Condivisione dei rischi; riforma EMU; moral hazard; decision makers; cost-bearers.

Giovanni Pitruzzella, Come cambia la Costituzione economica europea tra condivisione dei rischi e moral hazard in "DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE" 2/2018, pp 31-42, DOI: 10.3280/DC2018-002003