La tutela del contraente debole nella platform economy

Titolo Rivista GIORNALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DI RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI
Autori/Curatori Guido Smorto
Anno di pubblicazione 2018 Fascicolo 2018/158
Lingua Italiano Numero pagine 21 P. 423-443 Dimensione file 266 KB
DOI 10.3280/GDL2018-158008
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FrancoAngeli è membro della Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA)associazione indipendente e non profit per facilitare (attraverso i servizi tecnologici implementati da CrossRef.org) l’accesso degli studiosi ai contenuti digitali nelle pubblicazioni professionali e scientifiche

Negli ultimi anni si è affermato un nuovo modello di attività produttiva nel quale piattaforme digitali mettono in contatto gruppi interdipendenti di agenti economici per facilitare lo scambio di beni e l’erogazione di servizi. Dinanzi a questa trasformazione nell’organizzazione d’impresa, nel coordinamento del lavoro e nella struttura dei mercati, il diffuso appello a stabilire un "terreno di gioco neutrale" diviene la premessa per proporre la deregolamentazione di interi comparti economici valorizzando la capacità di autogoverno delle piattaforme. Mentre le reazioni a queste proposte sono confinate quasi esclusivamente alla questione del lavoro, è mancata finora un’analisi più generale dei rapporti di forza nell’economia di piattaforma. A partire da queste premesse, l’articolo intende offrire una riflessione critica sulla disparità di potere contrattuale nei rapporti tra piattaforme digitali, prestatori di servizi (lavoratori dipendenti o meno) e beneficiari della prestazione. L’articolo mostra come le piattaforme utilizzino le clausole contrattuali, la struttura dei propri siti e gli algoritmi che governano le transazioni economiche per sfruttare il proprio potere nei confronti di tutti gli utilizzatori della piattaforma e presenta alcune raccomandazioni al riguardo.;

Keywords:Economia di piattaforma; Economia della condivisione; Lavoro digitale; Consumatori; Disparità di potere contrattuale; Condizioni generali di contratto

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Guido Smorto, La tutela del contraente debole nella platform economy in "GIORNALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DI RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI " 158/2018, pp 423-443, DOI: 10.3280/GDL2018-158008