L’uso dei patti di non concorrenza in Italia: uno studio empirico

Titolo Rivista GIORNALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DI RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI
Autori/Curatori Tito Boeri, Andrea Garnero, Lorenzo G. Luisetto
Anno di pubblicazione 2023 Fascicolo 2022/176
Lingua Italiano Numero pagine 35 P. 609-643 Dimensione file 435 KB
DOI 10.3280/GDL2022-176006
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FrancoAngeli è membro della Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA)associazione indipendente e non profit per facilitare (attraverso i servizi tecnologici implementati da CrossRef.org) l’accesso degli studiosi ai contenuti digitali nelle pubblicazioni professionali e scientifiche

Ricerche empiriche recenti evidenziano la pervasività del potere datoriale nel mercato del lavo-ro (monopsonio del lavoro). Diversi fattori alimentano tale potere di mercato, tra cui le restri-zioni alla mobilità dei lavoratori che rendono più difficile cambiare occupazione. Tra queste restrizioni vi sono i patti (o clausole) di non concorrenza che limitano la capacità dei lavoratori di (re)impiegare la propria professionalità una volta terminato il rapporto di lavoro. Il contribu-to presenta le principali evidenze di uno studio empirico su quadro regolativo, utilizzo, inci-denza e contenuto dei patti di non concorrenza nel mercato del lavoro italiano. Tali clausole risultano essere piuttosto diffuse, anche tra i lavoratori a basso salario e che non hanno accesso a informazioni confidenziali. Possibili interventi regolativi sono discussi nelle conclusioni.;

Keywords:Patto di non concorrenza; Regolazione del mercato del lavoro; Mobilità occupa-zionale; Monopsonio; Competizione.

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Tito Boeri, Andrea Garnero, Lorenzo G. Luisetto, L’uso dei patti di non concorrenza in Italia: uno studio empirico in "GIORNALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DI RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI " 176/2022, pp 609-643, DOI: 10.3280/GDL2022-176006