Market Failures and Multi-layered Collective Action. US Economic Debates

Author/s Fabio Masini, Albertina Nania
Publishing Year 2023 Issue 2023/1 Language English
Pages 21 P. 69-89 File size 86 KB
DOI 10.3280/SPE2023-001003
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The paper reconstructs the debates in the USA about economic theorizing and policymaking advisory concerning a multi-layered system of governments. Beyond apparent similarities, it highlights the ontological divides between Ostrom-Tiebout- Warren on polycentric governance and Buchanan on competitive federalism on the one side, and Musgrave’s and Olson’s fiscal federalism. It further underlines how such divides - concerning the relative role of individuals, markets, collective author- ities, and social order - echoed similar debates in Europe related to a multi-layered economic system, again depending mostly on different ontological assumptions.

Keywords: competitive federalism, polycentric governance, fiscal federalism, Bu- chanan, Musgrave, Tiebout, Ostrom

Jel codes: B31, D62, D71, H41, H77

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Fabio Masini, Albertina Nania, Market Failures and Multi-layered Collective Action. US Economic Debates in "HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY" 1/2023, pp 69-89, DOI: 10.3280/SPE2023-001003