Contractual arrangements in the Italian durum wheat supply chain: The impacts of the "Fondo grano duro"

Titolo Rivista ECONOMIA AGRO-ALIMENTARE
Autori/Curatori Stefano Ciliberti, Gaetano Martino, Angelo Frascarelli, Gabriele Chiodini
Anno di pubblicazione 2019 Fascicolo 2019/2
Lingua Inglese Numero pagine 20 P. 235-254 Dimensione file 190 KB
DOI 10.3280/ECAG2019-002004
Il DOI è il codice a barre della proprietà intellettuale: per saperne di più clicca qui

Qui sotto puoi vedere in anteprima la prima pagina di questo articolo.

Se questo articolo ti interessa, lo puoi acquistare (e scaricare in formato pdf) seguendo le facili indicazioni per acquistare il download credit. Acquista Download Credits per scaricare questo Articolo in formato PDF

Anteprima articolo

FrancoAngeli è membro della Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA)associazione indipendente e non profit per facilitare (attraverso i servizi tecnologici implementati da CrossRef.org) l’accesso degli studiosi ai contenuti digitali nelle pubblicazioni professionali e scientifiche

In Italy, the use of contracts is restricted to a small share of the durum wheat production used to obtain high quality pasta in order to ensure the origin of durum wheat. In response to the permanent crisis of this strategic sector, the Italian Ministry of Agriculture introduced the so-called "Fondo grano duro" in 2016. It aims to give financial support to farmers who sign a contract with pasta producers to supply durum wheat. This paper represents a preliminary attempt to approach and investigate the impacts of the "Fondo" on coordination of decisions. Therefore, a case study design was used and several durum wheat contracts funded by the "Fondo" were analysed and classified according to the principles of Transaction Cost Economics (tce). To this regard, findings could pave the way for a discussion on the nature of the "Fondo" in the light of the recent developments of the tce concerning the meso-institutional layer.

Keywords:Transaction Cost Economics, contracts, durum wheat, mesoinstitution, Italy.

Jel codes:Q13, Q18

  1. Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  2. Pindyck, R.S. (2001). The dynamics of commodity spot and futures markets: a primer. Energy Journal, 22, 1-29.
  3. Bianchi, A. (1995). Durum wheat crop in Italy. In N. Di Fonzo, F. Kaan, & M. Nachit (eds.). Durum wheat quality in the Mediterranean region (pp. 103-108). Zaragoza: ciheam, 1995.
  4. Cacchiarelli, L., & Sorrentino, A. (2016). Antitrust intervention and price transmission in pasta supply chain. Agricultural and food economics, 4(2).
  5. Cacchiarelli, L., Lass, D., & Sorrentino, A. (2016). cap Reform and Price Transmission in the Italian Pasta Chain. Agribusiness, 32(4), 482-497.
  6. Carillo, F. (2016). Vertical integration in Italian pasta supply chain: a farm level analysis. Rivista di economic agraria, 1, 47-66. DOI: 10.13128/REA-18377
  7. Dawson, P.J. (2015). Measuring the Volatility of Wheat Futures Prices on the liffe. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66(1), 20-35. DOI: 10.1111/1477-9552.12092
  8. Defra (2010). The 2007/08 Agricultural Price Spikes: Causes and Policy Implications. -- Available at: http://archive.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/food/pdf/agprice100105.pdf Last accessed: 13 October, 2018.
  9. European Commission (2018). Durum wheat market An EU perspective. – Available at: www.italmopa.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/144_all_2.pdf Last accessed: 23 October, 2018.
  10. Franks, J.R. (2010). ‘Coping with the credit crunch?’ A financial appraisal of UK farming. Journal of Farm Management, 14, 41-66.
  11. Grandori, A. (2017). Linnaeus in the jungle: configurational lenses for discerning forms of economic organization in agri-business. In G. Martino et al. (eds.), It’s a jungle out there – the strange animals of economic organization in agri-food value chains (pp. 209-222). Wageningen Academic Publishers.
  12. Martino, G., Pampanini, R., & Morbidelli, F. (2012). Integration policy in the agrifood chains: theory and empirical evidences. Agricultural Economics/Zemedelska Ekonomika, 58(9), 409-424.
  13. Menard, C. (2013). Hybrid Model of Organization. Alliance, Joint Ventures, Networks, and other “Strange” Animals. In R. Gibbons, & J. Roberts (eds.). The Handbook of Organizational Economics (pp. 1066-1108). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  14. Menard, C. (2014). Embedding organizational arrangements: towards a general model. Journal of Institutional Economics, 10(4), 567-589. DOI: 10.1017/S1744137414000228
  15. Menard, C. (2015). Do contracts solve it all? International Seminar, “Through the Lens of the Contract: Regulating AgriFood System in the Future of Europe”, March 5, 2015, Perugia, Italy.
  16. Menard, C., & Klein, P.G. (2004). Organizational issues in the agrifood sector: toward a comparative approach. American journal of agricultural economics, 86(3), 750-755.
  17. Menard, C. (2014). Embedding organizational arrangements: towards a general model. Journal of Institutional Economics, 10(4), 567-589. DOI: 10.1017/S1744137414000228
  18. Menard, C. (2017a). Finding our way in the jungle: insights from organization theory. In G. Martino et al. (eds.). It’s a jungle out there - the strange animals of economic organization in agri-food value chains (pp. 124-139). Wageningen Academic Publishers.
  19. Menard, C. (2017b). Meso-institutions: The variety of regulatory arrangements in the water sector. Utilities Policy, 49, 6-19.
  20. Menard, C. (2018). Organization and governance in the agrifood sector: How can we capture their variety?. Agribusiness, 34(1), 142-160.
  21. Pindyck, R.S. (2004). Volatility and commodity price dynamics. Journal of Futures Markets, 24, 1029-1047.
  22. Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72 (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007.
  23. Royer, A., Menard C., & Gouin D.M. (2016). Reassessing marketing boards as hybrid arrangements: evidence from Canadian experiences..Agricultural economics, 47(1), 105-116.
  24. Saccomandi, V. (1998). Agricultural Market Economics: A Neo-institutional Analysis of the Exchange, Circulation and Distribution of Agricultural Products (European Perspectives on Rural Development). Assen, The Netherland: Royal Van Gorcum.
  25. Solazzo, R., Petriccione G., & Perito, M.A. (2015). Lo strumento contrattuale nella filiera del grano duro in Italia: i motivi della scarsa diffusione. Agriregionieuropa, 43.
  26. Williamson, O.E. (2000). The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of economic literature, 38(3), 595-613.
  27. Williamson, O.E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The Free Press.
  28. Williamson, O.E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 269-296.
  29. Yin, R.K. (2009). Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks, US: Sage.

  • Matching ecological transition and food security in the cereal sector: The role of farmers' preferences on production contracts Stefano Ciliberti, Angelo Frascarelli, Gaetano Martino, in Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems 1114590/2023
    DOI: 10.3389/fsufs.2023.1114590

Stefano Ciliberti, Gaetano Martino, Angelo Frascarelli, Gabriele Chiodini, Contractual arrangements in the Italian durum wheat supply chain: The impacts of the "Fondo grano duro" in "ECONOMIA AGRO-ALIMENTARE" 2/2019, pp 235-254, DOI: 10.3280/ECAG2019-002004