Journal title STUDI ECONOMICI
Author/s Chiara Donnini
Publishing Year 2014 Issue 2013/110
Language Italian Pages 21 P. 35-55 File size 151 KB
DOI 10.3280/STE2013-110003
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This paper studies the notion of fairness in coalitional pure exchange economies involving uncertainty and asymmetric information. We propose a new concept of coalitional fair allocations and study the relationships with the notions of competitive equilibria. Finally we compare individual and coalitional models.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, coalitional fairness, equity, envy, core allocation, competitive equilibria
Jel codes: D51, D82
Chiara Donnini, On a notion à la Gabszewicz of fairness in coalitional economies in "STUDI ECONOMICI " 110/2013, pp 35-55, DOI: 10.3280/STE2013-110003