Public company and public financing of political parties

Journal title ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Author/s Danilo Stentella
Publishing Year 2022 Issue 2022/2
Language Italian Pages 21 P. 233-253 File size 830 KB
DOI 10.3280/EP2022-002002
DOI is like a bar code for intellectual property: to have more infomation click here

Below, you can see the article first page

If you want to buy this article in PDF format, you can do it, following the instructions to buy download credits

Article preview

FrancoAngeli is member of Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA), a not-for-profit association which run the CrossRef service enabling links to and from online scholarly content.

The reintroduction in Italy of a public funding mechanism for political parties, the entity of which was directly and at least mainly linked to a significant percentage of the profits generated by state shareholdings, could lead to a greater propensity for political leaders to choose management talented and the adoption of an effective system of verification of the management procedures of this public heritage. In this way, the apparently endemic plague of high-level white-collar clientelism could be drastically reduced and at the same time realized a more efficient management of public property, of a private nature, if we really want to assign this category a cogent value. The economic policy reforms introduced in recent decades by the governments of the most industrialized countries have been strongly influenced by the doctrine of New Public Management, a radical approach capable of compromising the structural and ethical integrity of the public sector by subordinating social justice to economic efficiency, a transformation characterized by the cut in public spending that has also overwhelmed a fundamental institution of the democratic system, the political parties. Unfortunately, the past of public enterprises has greatly facilitated those reforms, as for a certain historical period these have shown a chronic tendency towards low productivity, compared to private enterprises, also due to clientelist policies and intensive use of the labor factor. Since public service elements and business elements coexist especially in the public utilities sector, the latter capable of generating income, public enterprises can represent a useful and prudent form of diversification of revenues for public finance that can significantly reduce liquidity risks, even more in a historical phase of recurrent international financial and economic crises. With the reintroduction of public funding of parties, directly and exclusively connected to a significant percentage of the profits generated by state participations, the choice of capable management and careful verification of administrative procedures would certainly be an essential concern of political leaders. Public funding of political parties was introduced in 1974 with the L. 195/1974 to counteract the collusions with big economic powers, already arisen in previous years. It was completely abolished with D.L. 149/2013, converted into L. 13/2014, leaving space to a growing lobbying activity and indirect party financing. The question this paper tries to answer is: can the public company be efficiently managed by the State, produce income and services for the community, without improperly giving rise to chronically negative management results and help to finance the constitutionally guaranteed right to organize into political parties by financing their mechanism?

Keywords: public economy, public companies; public financing of political parties, privatizations.

Jel codes: H3, H6, H72

  1. Momigliano F. (1975). Economia industriale e teoria dell’impresa. Bologna.
  2. Baldarelli M.G. (2005). Le aziende eticamente orientate. Mission, governance, accountability. Bologna.
  3. Bouckaert G., Mikeladze M. (2008). Introduction. The NISPAcee Journal of Public
  4. Administration and Policy, Special Issue: A Distinctive European Model? The Neo-Weberian State, I(2), Winter 2008/2009, Bratislava.
  5. Buchanan J. M., Tullock G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor.
  6. Buchanan J. M. (1978). From private preferences to public philosophy: the development of public choice. The economics of politics, 18. Buchanan J. M. (1993). How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper?. Constitutional Political Economy, 4(1).
  7. Caffè F. (1966). Politica economica. Torino.
  8. Castelli C. (2002). Esperienze di successo nelle amministrazioni pubbliche: un’analisi internazionale comparata. Lugano.
  9. Colarizi S., Gervasoni M. (2012). La tela di Penelope, storia della seconda repubblica. Bari.
  10. Crisafulli V. (1969). I partiti nella Costituzione. In Studi per il XX anniversario dell’Assemblea Costituente. Firenze.
  11. Dahk R. A., Lindblom C. E. (1953). Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Politico-economic Systems Resolved Into Basic Social Processes. New York.
  12. Degl’Innocenti M. (1990). Per uno studio sul tema delle municipalizzazioni nella politica socialista fino all’avvento del fascismo. In Fondazione Luigi Micheletti, L’esperienza delle aziende municipalizzate tra economia e società. Atti del seminariodi studi storici per l’80° di fondazione dell’ASM. Brescia.
  13. Denhardt J. V., Denhardt R. (2002). The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering. Public Administration Review. DOI: 10.1111/0033-3352.00117
  14. Esfahani H. S., Ardakani A. T. (2002). What Determines the Extent of Public Ownership?. Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
  15. Fertilio F. (2017). Così nacque il patto segreto che legò i giudici e la sinistra. il Giornale. it, 24/3/, -- in https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/spettacoli/cos-nacque-pattosegreto-che-leg-i-giudici-e-sinistra-1378492.html (web 29.5.2020).
  16. Fowles J. (1993). Changing notions of accountability: a social policy view. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 3. DOI: 10.1108/09513579310042588
  17. Giavazzi F. (1985). Una nota sul debito pubblico in Italia. In: Cozzi T., a cura di Moneta ed economia nazionale. Torino, p. 129.
  18. Graeber D. (2012). Debito. I primi 5000 anni, Milano.
  19. Gunn L. (1987). Perspectives on Public Management. In: Kooiman J. and Eliassen K. (eds). Managing Public Organizations: Lessons from Contemporary European Experience. London.
  20. Hood C. (1991). Administrative Argument. Dartmouth.
  21. Jacobs J. (1992). Systems of Survival. A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics. New York.
  22. Hooghe L., Marks G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1). DOI: 10.1017/S0007123408000409
  23. Ignazi P., Fiorelli C. (2021). The End of Cornucopia: Party Financing after the Great Recession, Government and Opposition.
  24. Judt T. (2011). Guasto è il mondo. Roma.
  25. Kaletsky A. (2010). A challenge to economic orthodoxy. The Economist, 22/11.
  26. Leontief W. (1976). National economic planning: Methods and problems. Challenge, july/august, 19(3). Liiv T. R. (2009). New Public Management versus Neo-Weberian State in Central and Eastern Europe. The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 1.
  27. Malcovati P., Saraceno P., Spini G. (1958). Ezio Vanoni. Torino.
  28. McMillan J., Woodruff C. (2000), Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order. 98 MIcH. L. REv. 2421; DOI: 10.2307/1290349
  29. Meneguzzo M. (1995). Dal new public management alla public governance: il pendolo della ricerca sull’amministrazione pubblica. Azienda Pubblica, 3.
  30. Mortati C. (1949). Concetto e funzione dei partiti politici. Quaderni di Ricerca, s.l. Nozick R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York.
  31. Occorsio E. (1994). IRI storia di un ente di cattiva gestione. La Repubblica, 6/5.
  32. OCSE (2020). Implementing the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Review of Recent Developments.
  33. Osborne D., Gaebler T. (1992). Reinventing Government. How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector. Boston.
  34. Ostrom V., Ostrom E. (1977). Public Goods and Public Choices. In: E. S. Savas. Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 7-49.
  35. Petitot J. (2012). Il liberalismo incompreso. Domenica Il Sole 24 Ore, 17/06.
  36. Pianola R. (1996). L’illusione del mercato. Milano.
  37. Pollitt C., Bouckaert G. (2000). Public management reforms. Cambridge.
  38. Pomicino P.C. (2000). Strettamente riservato. Le memorie di un superministro della prima repubblica. Milano.
  39. Rawls J. (1982). Una teoria della giustizia. Milano. Traduzione di A theory of justice. Cambridge (1971).
  40. Rizzo S., Stella G.A. (2007). La casta. Così i politici italiani sono diventati intoccabili. Milano.
  41. Ruiz Estrada M.A. (2011). Economic modelling: definition, evaluation and trends, MPRA Paper 40584. University Library of Munich, Germany.
  42. S. A., Corte dei Conti, Sezioni riunite in sede di controllo, Rapporto 2016 sul coordinamento della finanza pubblica, Roma, 2016.
  43. Sacchelli O. (2012). Ci fu una regia occulta degli Usa dietro Mani pulite? Le rivelazioni dell’ex ambasciatore americano. il Giornale.it, 29/8, -- in https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/interni/ci-fu-regia-occulta-degli-usa-dietro-mani-pulite-rivelazioni-833119.html (web 29.1.2021).
  44. Salvemini G. (1990). Socialismo, riformismo, democrazia: antologia di scritti politici, civili, autobiografici. Bari.
  45. Schick A. (2003). The Performing State: Reflection on an Idea Whose Time Has Come but Whose Implementation Has Not. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 3(2).
  47. Silva F. (2013). Storia dell’IRI. 3. I difficili anni ’70 e i tentativi di rilancio negli anni ’80. Bari. Spaventa L. (1985). Nota sulla sostenibilità della crescita del debito pubblico. In Moneta ed economia nazionale. Torino.
  48. Turani G. (1995). L’Eni svuotata dai partiti torna ad essere azienda. La Repubblica, 22.02.
  49. Vanoni E. Discorsi al Senato, 21 luglio 1954, Atti parlamentari.
  50. Villari L. (1977). Saraceno. Intervista sulla Ricostruzione 1943-53. Bari.
  51. Visco I. (2020). Le prospettive e le necessità di riforma dell’economia italiana. Intervento di Ignazio Visco Governatore della Banca D’Italia. Consultazione nazionale. Roma, 13 giugno.
  52. Williamson O. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. New York.

  • Explorando tendencias del devenir público: cienciometría y revisión sistemática Edgar Romario Aranibar-Ramos, Freddy Raul Salinas-Gainza, Nilton Axel Seguil-Ormeño, in Universitas /2023 pp.109
    DOI: 10.17163/uni.n39.2023.05

Danilo Stentella, Azienda pubblica e finanziamento pubblico dei partiti politici in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 2/2022, pp 233-253, DOI: 10.3280/EP2022-002002