A measure of the sustainable connection between highest remunerations’ and economic performance

Author/s Martina Vallesi
Publishing Year 2014 Issue 2013/2 Language English
Pages 15 P. 145-159 File size 947 KB
DOI 10.3280/RISS2013-002008
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Focusing on the agency conflict between manager and shareholders and on the definitions of tunneling and propping, we delve into the related party transactions between a group and its management. Firstly, the paper examines actual and previous information to disclose for directors board remunerations (as for IAS, Consob and TUF). Such remunerations are based on a contract with legal and moral managers obligations to the companies of the group they run and to the stakeholder of such companies. For this reason, a balance between their remunerations and their performance is necessary to achieve preserving the interests of all the subjects involved in the companies’ activities and maintaining the continuity of the group. Then, using regressions, we measure, in a sample of listed companies, if there is a significant and sustainable connection between particular remunerations of the highest paid members of the directors board and the economic group performance.

Keywords: Agency theory, directors’ board remuneration, related party, related party transactions.

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Martina Vallesi, A measure of the sustainable connection between highest remunerations’ and economic performance in "RIVISTA DI STUDI SULLA SOSTENIBILITA'" 2/2013, pp 145-159, DOI: 10.3280/RISS2013-002008