«Enactivism»: intentionality, computational simulation. A research perspective

Author/s Barbara Sonzogni, Gabriella D’Ambrosio
Publishing Year 2022 Issue 2022/128 Language Italian
Pages 15 P. 20-34 File size 236 KB
DOI 10.3280/SR2022-128002
DOI is like a bar code for intellectual property: to have more infomation click here

Below, you can see the article first page

If you want to buy this article in PDF format, you can do it, following the instructions to buy download credits

Article preview

FrancoAngeli is member of Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA), a not-for-profit association which run the CrossRef service enabling links to and from online scholarly content.

The question of the eligibility of the intentional action model calls into ques- tion the theses on the limits of conscious control of action and on the overcoming of the dualist conception of the mind-brain relationship. In this regard, the theme of the heterogenesis of ends - present for some time in the sociological tradition - finds its origin in the dynamics of social interdependence within which teleo- logically oriented acts fall. All this has obvious implications with regard to com- putational designs, thanks to which it is possible to include in the model aspects inherent in mental states and motives of teleological and non-teleological action. Moreover, one of the emerging arguments about the philosophy of the mind is undoubtedly that which refers to the so-called "enactivist" theory of the embodied mind, whose basic principle alludes to the inseparability of mental and bodily life.

  1. M.C. Amoretti (2011), La mente fuori dal corpo. Prospettive esternaliste in relazione al men- tale, Milano, FrancoAngeli.
  2. H. Arendt (1971-1978), The Life of the Mind, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 2 voll.;
  3. tr. it. La vita della mente, Bologna, il Mulino, 1987-2009.
  4. P. Bello, M. Guarini (2010), Introspection and Mindreading as Mental Simulation, in Procee- dings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 32, pp. 2022-7.
  5. M. Bonolis (2011), «Molti “meccanismi”, nessun “meccanismo”. Il non senso del termine “socio- logia analitica”», Sociologia e ricerca sociale, 95, pp. 13-48, DOI: 10.3280/SR2011-095002
  6. M. Bonolis (2020), La mente e l’azione. Sociologia e «metapsicologia», Milano, FrancoAngeli.
  7. M. Bonolis (2022), La naturalizzazione della mente e il suo contrario, in M. Bonolis, C. Lom- bardo (a c. di), Sociologia degli stati mentali. Teoria e ricerca, Milano, FrancoAngeli.
  8. M. Bonolis, L. Sabetta (2019), «Verso una congiunzione funzionale delle due etiche weberia- ne», Quaderni di Sociologia, 43, 81, 3, pp. 7-26,
  9. R. Boudon (1977), Effets pervers et ordre social, Paris, Puf; tr. it. Effetti perversi dell’azione sociale, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1981.
  10. E. Carli (a c. di) (1997), Cervelli che parlano. Il dibattito su mente, coscienza e intelligenza artificiale, Milano, Bruno Mondadori.
  11. E. Carli, F. Grigenti (2019), Mente, cervello, intelligenza artificiale, Milano-Torino, Pearson.
  12. F. Caruana, A.M. Borghi (2013), «Embodied Cognition: una nuova psicologia», Giornale italiano di psicologia, 40, pp. 23-48, DOI: 10.1421/73973
  13. S.H. Chen, U. Gostoli (2017), «Coordination in the El Farol Bar problem: The role of social preferences and social networks», Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 12, 1, pp. 59-93,
  14. A. Clark, D. Chalmers (1998), «The extended mind», Analysis, 58, 1, pp. 7-19,
  15. J.S. Coleman (1990), Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
  16. F. Dretske (1996), «Phenomenal Externalism or if Meanings ain’t in the Head, where are Qua- lia?», Philosophical Issues, 7, pp. 143-58, DOI: 10.2307/1522899
  17. É. Durkheim (1893-1902), De la division du travail social, Paris, Félix Alcan; tr. it. La divisione del lavoro sociale, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 1967.
  18. E. Durkheim (1914), «Le dualisme de la nature humaine et ses conditions sociales», Scientia, 15, pp. 206-221; tr. it. Il dualismo della natura umana e le sue condizioni sociali, in Educa- zione come socializzazione, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1973.
  19. J. Elster (2007), Agir contre soi. La faiblesse de volonté, Paris, Odile Jacob; tr. it. La volontà debole, Bologna, il Mulino, 2008.
  20. F. Faggin (2022), Irriducibile. La coscienza, la vita. i computer e la nostra natura, Milano, Mondadori.
  21. D.B. Fogel, K. Chellapilla, P.J. Angeline (1999), «Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationa- lity Reconsidered», Ieee Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 3, 2, pp. 142-6, DOI: 10.1109/4235.771167
  22. M. Garofalo (2006), Modeling the «El Farol Bar Problem» in NetLogo, https://ccl.northwe- stern.edu/2006/ElFarol.pdf.
  23. L. Hercog, T. Fogarty (2001), Social Simulation Using a Multi-agent Model Based on Classifier Sy- stems: The Emergence of Vacillating Behaviour in the «El Farol» Bar Problem, in P.L. Lanzi,
  24. W. Stolzmann, S.W. Wilson (eds.), Advances in Learning Classifier Systems, Berlin, Springer.
  25. J. Kim (1999), «Making Sense of Emergence», Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Traditions, 95, 1-2, pp. 3-36, DOI: 10.1023/A:1004563122154
  26. K. Löwith (1953-1960), Heidegger Denker in dürftiger Zeit, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck e Ruprecht; tr. it. Saggi su Heidegger, Torino, Einaudi, 1966-1974.
  27. N.M. Maldonato, A. Recchia Luciani (2008), «Intemporalità della coscienza. Note a margine sul sentimento del tempo», Rivista di estetica, 37, pp. 125-40,
  28. R. Manzotti (2011), «The Spread Mind: Is Consciousness Situated?», Teorema, 30, 2, pp. 55-78.
  29. H. Marcuse (1937), «Über den affirmativen Charakter der Kultur», Zeitschrift für Sozialfor- schung, 6, 1, pp. 54-94; tr. it. Sul carattere affermativo della cultura, in Cultura e società. Saggi di teoria critica 1933-1965, Torino, Einaudi, 1969.
  30. N. Martin, K. Morich (2011), «Unconscious mental processes in consumer choice: Toward a new model of consumer behavior», Journal of Brand Management Advance online publication,
  31. H.R. Maturana, F.J. Varela (1979), Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Boston, Reidel Publishing Company; tr. it. Autopoiesi e cognizione. La realizzazione del vivente, Venezia, Marsilio, 1985.
  32. H.R. Maturana, F.J. Varela (1984), El árbol del conocimiento (Las bases biológicas del en- tendimiento humano), Santiago de Chile, Editorial Universitaria SA; tr. it. L’albero della conoscenza, Milano, Garzanti, 1987.
  33. W.F. Ogburn (1922), Social Change: With Respect to Culture and Original Nature, New York, Huebsch.

Barbara Sonzogni, Gabriella D’Ambrosio, «Enattivismo», intenzionalità, simulazione computazionale. Una prospettiva di ricerca in "SOCIOLOGIA E RICERCA SOCIALE " 128/2022, pp 20-34, DOI: 10.3280/SR2022-128002