Diritto e natura a Oxford: il caso di H.L.A. Hart

Author/s Carolina Gasparoli
Publishing Year 2009 Issue 2009/2
Language Italian Pages 12 P. 181-192 File size 136 KB
DOI 10.3280/TP2009-002010
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Law and nature. The case for H.L.A. Hart - Hart is one of the most prominent philosophers of law of the last century. Published in 1961, his book The Concept of Law has influenced many of the leading figures in contemporary legal theory. Hart held the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford University from 1952 until 1968 and he chose Ronald Dworkin as his successor. In his last book Diritto e natura. H.L.A. e la filosofia di Oxford, Mario Ricciardi takes the uneasy relationship between the two philosophers as the starting point of his inquiry and claims that Dworkin’s critique of Hart’s legal theory has misinterpreted many relevant aspects of Hart’s approach to law. As a result, many scholars have paid little attention to the cultural and philosophical background of Hart’s work. In particular, Ricciardi suggests that, in this work, Hart uses a specific notion of analysis, namely connective analysis, which Gilbert Ryle and Peter F. Strawson had opposed to the decompositive one. Such a reading of The Concept of Law generates a new understanding of the role played by the minimum content of natural law in Hart’s legal theory.

Carolina Gasparoli, Diritto e natura a Oxford: il caso di H.L.A. Hart in "TEORIA POLITICA" 2/2009, pp 181-192, DOI: 10.3280/TP2009-002010