How is Weakness of the Will Possible (in the Philosophy of Donald Davidson?)

Journal title PARADIGMI
Author/s Giacomo Romano
Publishing Year 2016 Issue 2016/2
Language Italian Pages 19 P. 131-149 File size 191 KB
DOI 10.3280/PARA2016-002011
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After analysing it, the author of this essay expresses his criticism of the notion and of the problem of the Weakness of Will in the philosophy of mind and action of Donald Davidson. In Davidson's philosophical system, Weakness of Will is source of a number of incoherences. These incoherences are 1) the "all things considered" clause in prima facie judgments; 2) the attribution of Weakness of Will to simple causal mechanisms, 3) the incompatibility between unconditional judgments and akrasia, 4) the supposed straightforwardness of the relation between intention and action as conceived by Davidson, 5) the effective causal efficacy of the unconditional judgments. Given these incoherences, the author of the present essay claims that Weakness of Will does not find its place as a theoretical problem in the philosophy of Davidson.

Keywords: Action, Akrasia, Donald Davidson, Irrationality, Rationality, Weakness of Will.

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Giacomo Romano, Come è possibile la debolezza della volontà (nella filosofia di Donald Davidson)? in "PARADIGMI" 2/2016, pp 131-149, DOI: 10.3280/PARA2016-002011