The new financing and equalization system for the non-essential functions of the Italian regions: a simulation of the redistributive effects

Journal title ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Author/s Alberto Baffa
Publishing Year 2020 Issue 2019/3
Language Italian Pages 34 P. 7-40 File size 249 KB
DOI 10.3280/EP2019-003001
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This article concerns a simulation of the effects of the new financing and equalization system for the non-essential functions of the regions, provided for by legislation of fiscal federalism, which should enter into force in 2021. The analysis shows how the replacement of state transfers to the regions with the attribution of tax revenue is a decisive aspect for the financial effects of the reform, in terms of gains and losses for each region. Furthermore, it indicates that the equalization model of fiscal capacities has a limited redistributive power, especially if compared to all the revenues linked to non-essential functions.

Keywords: Equalization, fiscal capacities, fiscal federalism, regions

Jel codes: H70, H73, H77

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Alberto Baffa, Il nuovo sistema di finanziamento e perequazione per le funzioni non essenziali delle regioni italiane: una simulazione degli effetti redistributivi in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 3/2019, pp 7-40, DOI: 10.3280/EP2019-003001