The financial side of asymmetric regionalism

Author/s Dario Stevanato
Publishing Year 2019 Issue 2019/3 Language Italian
Pages 16 P. 95-110 File size 300 KB
DOI 10.3280/ES2019-003009
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Article 116 paragraph 3 of the Italian Constitution envisages the chance for each Region to bargain with the Government an agreement, subject to the approval of Parliament, in order to achieve a broader autonomy in the areas of shared competence. This provision, which was introduced by means of a constitutional reform that dates back to 2001, has so far remained unexplored. However, subsequent to the action recently taken by some Regions, the matter has come to the foreground, raising concerns on the "asymmetric regionalism" that it would bring about. In the present article the focus will be on the financial aspects intertwined with the transfer of functions to the Regions who so requested: it goes without saying that such an issue has triggered a dispute on the criteria to be taken into account for tax revenue sharing, which remains to be disentangled.

Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, Differentiated Autonomy, Asymmetric Regionalism, Fiscal Residuum, Fiscal Equalization, Tax Revenue Sharing

Jel codes: H77, R50

Dario Stevanato, Profili finanziari del regionalismo differenziato in "ECONOMIA E SOCIETÀ REGIONALE " 3/2019, pp 95-110, DOI: 10.3280/ES2019-003009