Reputazione e soluzioni di equilibrio nei contratti tra acquirenti e fornitori di servizi sanitari

Journal title ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Author/s Marcello Montefiori
Publishing Year 2001 Issue 2001/5
Language Italian Pages 34 P. File size 172 KB
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This paper aims to verify the role of reputation in contracting for health care services. First of all we define the dynamic equation for the reputation. Then it is necessary to build an intertemporal model using a current value Hamiltonian. The model works under the hypothesis that the demand for health services does not reflect neither the quality of the service nor the reputation of the provider. The final goal is to check, in relation to the contract type implemented by providers and purchasers of health services, whether reputation allows for equilibrium outcomes characterised by quality levels and effort to reduce costs above the minimum enforceable level. JEL I11 I18

Marcello Montefiori, Reputazione e soluzioni di equilibrio nei contratti tra acquirenti e fornitori di servizi sanitari in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 5/2001, pp , DOI: