Sense and linguistic meaning. A solution to the Burge-Kripke conflict

Journal title PARADIGMI
Author/s Carlo Penco
Publishing Year 2014 Issue 2013/3
Language English Pages 15 P. 75-89 File size 100 KB
DOI 10.3280/PARA2013-003006
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L‘autore applica una nota tensione tra aspetti cognitivi e semantici della nozione fregeana di senso alla discussione sugli indicali e discute dapprima l’attacco di Burge contro l’identificazione di senso e significato e la risposta di Kripke a favore di tale identificazione. Dopo avere mostrato gli aspetti problematici di entrambe le interpretazioni, l’autore sostiene che la tensione presente nel concetto fregeano di senso (semantico e cognitivo) aiuta a capire le difficoltà di entrambi i punti di vista e alcune tesi apparentemente contraddittorie di Frege sull’identità di senso di enunciati con indicali. L’autore conclude che la nozione fregeana di senso, anche nei suoi aspetti cognitivi, non può essere ricondotta a quella di significato linguistico e che la tensione fregeana tra due nozioni di senso può anche spiegare la discussione che Frege fa sull’indicale "io", usando la proposta di trattare le dimostrazioni come parte del senso degli indicali.

Keywords: Indexicals, Demonstrations, Sense and meaning, Frege, Burge, Kripke.

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  • CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE SENSE IN G. FREGE’S LOGICAL SEMANTICS Evgeniy V. Gluschenko, in The Journal of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Series "The Theory of Culture and Philosophy of Science" /2021 pp.39
    DOI: 10.26565/2306-6687-2021-63-05

Carlo Penco, Sense and linguistic meaning. A solution to the Burge-Kripke conflict in "PARADIGMI" 3/2013, pp 75-89, DOI: 10.3280/PARA2013-003006